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ABSTRACT 
 
 Mind wandering is a pervasive aspect of mental life. Wandering minds often lead 
to performance decrements during demanding tasks that require concentration, 
highlighting the need for devising strategies to ward off mind wandering and to mitigate 
its deleterious effects on task performance. Accordingly, this dissertation investigated 
whether a brief mindfulness intervention could reduce mind wandering. Experiment 1 
examined the influence of the brief mindfulness intervention on mind wandering during 
an ecologically valid sustained attention task, i.e., learning from a lecture video, and on 
the disruptive effects of mind wandering on lecture comprehension. Experiment 1 
provided no supporting evidence for the beneficial influence of the brief intervention on 
the occurrence of mind wandering during the lecture video, nor on the disruptive effects 
of mind wandering on lecture comprehension. Experiment 2 examined whether the brief 
mindfulness intervention could reduce behavioral indices of mind wandering during a 
widely-used sustained attention to response task (the SART). Experiment 2 produced no 
evidence for the beneficial influence of the brief intervention on mind wandering during 
the SART either. Taken together, the current experiments indicate that the brief 
mindfulness intervention employed in this dissertation exerted no beneficial effects on 
attentional control and mind wandering during demanding tasks, underscoring the 
importance of examining more robust mindfulness interventions in future investigations.   
The dissertation also examined the mediating role of self-reported trait 
mindfulness in the relationship between self-reported media multitasking frequency and 
ix 
 
 
mind wandering tendency. The mediation analysis revealed that trait mindfulness 
partially mediated the relationship between media multitasking frequency and mind 
wandering tendency. This partial mediation model suggests that habitual media 
multitasking is associated with an increased proclivity for mind wandering and that 
increased frequency of media multitasking is associated with lower levels of mindfulness, 
which is in turn associated with greater propensity for mind wandering. Therefore, it is 
plausible that habitual media multitaskers may find it onerous to prevent their minds 
from wandering because they compromise top-down attentional control while 
frequently and consistently switching attention among multiple forms of media, 
diminishing their ability to stay focused on a single task. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Harry had a lot of trouble keeping his mind on his lessons that day. It kept wandering 
up to the dormitory where his new broomstick was lying under his bed, or straying 
off to the Quidditch field where he’d be learning to play that night. He bolted his 
dinner that evening without noticing what he was eating, and then rushed upstairs 
with Ron to unwrap the Nimbus Two Thousand at last (Rowling, 1997, p. 166). 
So begins the story of Harry’s first experience with Quidditch in J. K. Rowling’s book 
Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone. If you are Harry Potter, who, at the age of 11, found out 
that he was a wizard and that he was accepted to the Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and 
Wizardry, and if you have recently received a broomstick, with which witches and wizards 
fly, to join the Quidditch (soccer game in the magic world, in which players fly with their 
broomsticks and pass around a ball among each other to score against the opponent team) 
team as the youngest Quidditch player Hogwarts has seen in a century, it is no wonder why 
your mind kept wandering up to your dormitory and your thoughts kept straying away from 
your classes off to the Quidditch field on this very first day that you are going to learn to play 
Quidditch.  
That being said, you do not have to be a wizard or witch for your mind to wander. Nor 
do you need to have a broomstick - the latest model of the time indeed - for your mind to 
stray off to thoughts that have nothing to do with a primary task in which you might be 
engaged. Our Muggle (nonmagic) lives are already replete with opportunities conducive to 
mind wandering. For instance, anyone who has tried to work in the office on a bright sunny 
day can attest to the somehow inevitable experience of mind wandering. In fact, experience 
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sampling studies in daily life settings demonstrate that people mind wander between 25% 
and 50% of the time (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009). 
Mind wandering represents a drift of attention from an external, ongoing task to an 
internal train of thought that is not relevant to the immediate task. In other words, 
individuals are not always engaged in task-related thoughts as they are completing a task. 
During mind wandering, individuals are said to engage in task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) 
(Giambra 1989), stimulus-independent thoughts (Antrobus, Singer, & Greenberg, 1966), or 
self-generated thoughts unrelated to an ongoing task (Smallwood, 2013). These terms are 
often used interchangeably, as they describe the experience of engaging in off-task thinking 
while on task. For purposes of this dissertation, TUTs will be used to refer to the experience 
of mind wandering, and task-related thoughts will be used to refer to the states of on-task 
thinking. 
Within the past decade, research on mind wandering has flourished for several 
reasons, including the increased scholarly interest in cognitive processes independent of 
exogenous input (e.g., internal attention), the advances in neuroimaging techniques, and the 
development of experimental paradigms for studying mind wandering under various 
conditions (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). One widely used paradigm to measure mind 
wandering is thought sampling, in which participants are sporadically probed during the 
task and asked to indicate whether they are on-task or off-task (Schooler et al., 2011). In a 
slightly different version of thought sampling, the self-caught method, participants are asked 
to provide spontaneous reports of off-task thinking by pressing a specific key anytime they 
notice themselves mind wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
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Although this mental experience of mind wandering has been shown to be beneficial 
under certain circumstances, e.g., autobiographical planning, avoiding boredom, etc. 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2015), it has been associated with performance decrements on 
diverse tasks, including sustained attention tasks (McVay & Kane, 2009), reading 
comprehension (Smallwood et al., 2008), and listening to lectures (Risko, Anderson, Sarwal, 
Engelhardt, & Kingstone, 2011). The question, hence, becomes what strategies are effective 
in reducing the occurrence of mind wandering during tasks requiring sustained attention 
and in reducing performance costs associated with mind wandering.  One plausible strategy 
that is being increasingly investigated in the mind wandering literature is mindfulness 
meditation training (MMT). Mindfulness can be thought of as the art of paying attention to 
the present moment and refining moment-to-moment awareness, capitalizing on one’s 
capacity for self-awareness and self-knowing (Kabat-Zinn, 2005). MMT has been proposed 
as an antidote for wandering minds (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013; Mrazek, Smallwood, & 
Schooler, 2012). 
The challenge of regulating mind wandering during sustained attention tasks and 
reducing its disruptive effects on task performance is especially applicable to educational 
settings, as mind wandering is likely to occur during lectures and/or while studying 
(Unsworth, McMillan, Brewer, & Spillers, 2012). Therefore, this dissertation primarily aims 
to address the following question:  
Does a brief mindfulness mediation influence the occurrence of mind wandering 
during an ecologically valid sustained attention task, learning from a lecture video?  
4 
 
Mind Wandering 
Attention and mind wandering 
Attention is a fundamental cognitive mechanism that allows individuals to select, 
filter, and process the abundance of information coming from the external environment 
through the senses, as well as internally-generated information and mental representations 
(Eysenck & Keane, 2015), as illustrated in the following quote by William James (1890): 
Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear 
and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or 
trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It 
implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others…  
(pp. 403-4). 
While the definition of attention is not so clear to many contemporary researchers, 
this famous quote touches upon the essential characteristics of attention with its description 
of attention as selectivity of processing. Attention is involved in focusing limited processing 
capacity on selected information, modulating the processing of selected information and 
sustaining vigilance (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011).  Basically, attention plays a key 
role in everyday life and serves innumerable practical and vital functions, varying from 
enabling the reading of a paper to affording the ability to avoid bumping into people in 
public.  
As William James (1890) put forward, attention can be directed to “objects” or “trains 
of thought”. An individual can focus attention on external stimuli or internal thoughts or 
images, sustain it, orient it to something else, and redirect it back to the original focal point 
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once strayed away from it. The ability to sustain attention for longer periods of time is 
remarkable and is necessary in diverse contexts. For instance, individuals need to sustain 
attention on what a friend is saying during a conversation or on the road while driving. 
Similarly, as a reader, you need to sustain attention on this paper to identify, encode, and 
parse words and transform them into meaningful sentences while building a situation model 
of the text to facilitate your comprehension. Nonetheless, for many people, attention is not 
sustained on task-relevant stimuli all the time and most people’s attention tends to falter and 
wane, leading to temporary attentional lapses during an ongoing task or total attentional 
disengagement from the task (Smallwood et al., 2008). 
These breakdowns in attention reflect interference from information irrelevant to a 
current task in the pursuit of task-relevant goals and/or activities (Mishra, Anguera, Ziegler, 
& Gazzaley, 2013). Just as this interference can originate from external sources of 
information, it can also be generated from internal information sources (Mishra et al., 2013). 
External interference, including distractions and interruptions, is caused by external stimuli 
coming through the senses. Internal interference, on the other hand, is generated from 
internal trains of thoughts. Regardless of whether or not the interference is from external or 
internal causes, attentional lapses can have negative consequences in a variety of situations 
that require individuals to sustain attention while accomplishing their goals and tasks 
(Schacter & Szpunar, 2015). 
While the effects of external interference on attention have been widely investigated, 
scholarly interest in attentional lapses due to internal interference has surged in recent 
years. One type of internal interference that has recently received attention from scientific 
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community is mind wandering. Mind wandering is a type of internal interference in which 
attention drifts away from a current, ongoing task and relevant external stimuli to self-
generated, internal thoughts unrelated to the task at hand (i.e., TUTs). This attentional shift 
is characterized by a state of perceptual decoupling, whereby attention is disengaged from 
perception of external stimuli and instead is focused on an internal train of thoughts 
(Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Thus, when the mind wanders, 
attention is derailed from an extrinsic task to an intrinsic train of TUTs. 
External and internal attention 
Because mind wandering is characterized by a shift of attention away from an 
ongoing task and relevant external stimuli to self-generated, internal information unrelated 
to the task at hand, distinguishing between external and internal attention can provide 
greater insight into mind wandering. In their taxonomy of external and internal attention, 
Chun et al. (2011) offered a distinction between external and internal attention with respect 
to where attention is directed, that is, the targets of attention. While there are different views 
on attention, they explain the same phenomena using different terminology applied to 
identical concepts. Therefore, the taxonomy of external and internal attention will be used 
as a guide to describe the attentional processes involved in mind wandering. Key elements 
from two other accounts of attention, working memory and executive control, will be 
incorporated into the discussion of mind wandering from the perspective of this taxonomy. 
Figure 1 presents a schematic overview of the taxonomy of external and internal 
attention. On opposite ends of a continuous axis are external and internal attention. Each box 
represents a target of attention and these boxes, especially the ones at the same level, are 
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interactive to a large extent. The interaction among different levels is characterized by goal-
directed, top-down attention and stimulus-driven, bottom-up attention, as represented by 
the arrows.  
 
Figure 1. A schematic overview of external and internal attention. On opposite ends of a continuous 
axis are external and internal attention. Each box represents a target of attention and these boxes, 
especially the ones at the same level, are interactive to a large extent. The arrows on the right 
represent goal-directed attention and the arrow on the bottom left represents stimulus-driven 
attention. 
 
In the taxonomy of Chun et al. (2011), external attention is involved in selecting and 
modulating sensory input and internal attention is involved in selecting, modulating, and 
maintaining self-generated internal information such as the contents of working memory. 
Thus, external attention is mainly concerned with perceptual attention to external stimuli, 
and internal attention is concerned with central or reflective attention to inner cognitive 
processes. While the targets of external attention are exogenous inputs coming in through 
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senses, the targets of internal attention are mental representations being encoded and 
maintained in working memory and/or retrieved from long term memory as well as internal 
trains of thoughts.  
As Eysenck and Keane (2015) pointed out, the role of working memory is crucial to 
understanding the interplay between external and internal attention. In their taxonomy, 
Chun et al. (2011) considered working memory as a distinct internal attention process on 
the grounds that what is being processed and maintained in working memory involves 
internal representations of external input that is not available any more. Within this 
taxonomy, working memory is placed at the interface between external and internal 
attention and is involved in the modulation of processing of relevant information and 
suppression of irrelevant information, drawing close parallels to Baddeley’s (2012) working 
memory model. The central executive component of working memory is especially of 
relevance and of great importance because it is functionally involved in various executive 
processes, including focusing attention, dividing attention between two targets, switching 
attention between tasks and interfacing with long term memory (Baddeley, 2012). 
Considering that working memory has a limited capacity (Baddeley, 2012; Chun et al., 2011), 
the central executive component plays a key role in selection and prioritization of what will 
be processed in working memory, which can be further explained by another account of 
executive processes – executive control theory (Engle & Kane, 2004).  
According to the executive control theory (Engle & Kane, 2004; Kane & Engle, 2002), 
executive control refers to the control of attentional or cognitive resources for the purposes 
of maintaining goals and achieving tasks in the presence of interference or distraction. 
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Executive control is generally regarded as a domain-general ability to direct attention to a 
task, to maintain it on the ongoing task, and to redirect attention to the ongoing task after 
becoming distracted. Thus, executive control involves the ability to focus and sustain 
attention on the task at hand and the ability to suppress interference or distractions. In other 
words, executive control reflects the ability to maintain the attentional control on task-
relevant information while at the same time inhibiting task-irrelevant information. 
Based on the executive control theory, mind wandering reflects a temporary lapse in 
executive control such that maintenance of task goals is disrupted by internal interference 
or TUTs. From the external and internal attention perspective (Chun et al., 2011) then, mind 
wandering reflects an attentional state in which internal trains of thoughts gain dominance 
over exogenous stimuli in working memory, and thus, mental representations of internally-
generated information become so salient that external attention or attention to perceptual 
information is diminished. Put another way when the mind wanders, the contents of internal 
attention are prioritized, encoded and maintained in working memory, leaving little deep 
processing capacity for perceptual information from external attention. 
How is mind wandering studied? 
Measures of mind wandering. Studies on mind wandering utilize thought sampling 
to capture individuals’ subjective mental experience while they are completing a task in 
laboratory settings (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 2015). There are two categories of thought 
sampling: the probe-caught method and the self-caught method. In the probe-caught 
method, participants are intermittently probed and asked to report on the contents of their 
thought (Antrobus et al., 1966; Giambra, 1995; Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2005; 
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Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 2015). In the self-caught method, participants are asked to 
provide spontaneous reports, usually by pressing a specific key on the keyboard, anytime 
they notice they have been mind wandering as they complete a task (Cunningham, Scerbo, & 
Freeman, 2000; Giambra, 1993; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 2015). Thought sampling is 
also used in ecologically valid settings to capture the contents of individuals’ thoughts in 
daily life and this is known as experience sampling (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
When used together, the probe-caught and self-caught methods can complement each 
other and can provide greater insight into individuals’ subjective mental experience than 
could be obtained by using either method alone (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 2015). The 
self-caught method provides an estimate of mind wandering episodes of which individuals 
are aware, whereas the probe-caught method can provide an estimate of mind wandering 
episodes of which individuals are not aware (Schooler et al., 2005). If an individual reports 
that he or she has been mind wandering at the time of the probe, this indicates that the 
individual was not aware that he or she had been mind wandering before being probed, 
because otherwise the individual would have reported that they had been mind wandering 
by pressing the assigned key before the probe appeared. 
While the validity of these self-reported measures of mind wandering may be 
questioned, they have been extensively used in previous studies and have been triangulated 
with objective measures. Previous studies have found variation in response time in relation 
to the reports of mind wandering (Carriere, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008; Cheyne, Carriere, 
Solman, & Smilek, 2011; McVay & Kane 2009) and have shown that variability in mind 
wandering is linked to changes in the pattern of eye movements (Foulsham, Farley, & 
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Kingstone, 2013; Reichle, Reineberg, & Schooler, 2010), in pupil dilation (Franklin, 
Broadway, Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2013; Smallwood et al., 2011), and in the 
frequency of eye blinks (Smilek, Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010). Mind wandering reports have 
also been associated with changes in electroencephalography (EEG) signals (Baird, 
Smallwood, Lutz, & Schooler, 2014; Barron Riby, Greer, & Smallwood, 2011; Kam et al., 2011) 
and in the blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) signals during functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) scans (Allen et al., 2013, Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & 
Schooler, 2009, Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, & D'Argembeau, 2011). 
Considering the link between self-reported measures of mind wandering and behavioral and 
neurocognitive markers of mind wandering, the probe-caught and self-caught methods can 
be used to study mind wandering in laboratory settings. 
Tasks used to study mind wandering. Investigations of mind wandering have used 
various tasks to examine the occurrence of mind wandering while participants are 
completing those tasks and the effects of mind wandering on task performance. One of the 
most widely used tasks to study mind wandering is the Sustained Attention to Response Task 
(SART; Robertson et al., 1997). The SART is a go/no-go sustained attention task in which 
participants are shown an array of visual stimuli of a single category (e.g., letters or numbers) 
and are asked to respond to nontargets and to withhold response to targets (e.g., letter X or 
number 3). In the SART, targets occur rarely. For instance, during an SART with 240 trials, 
there may be only 16 targets. Go/no-go stimuli are usually presented for a short duration 
(e.g., 300ms) followed by a mask (e.g., an encircled circle). SART errors, or the failures to 
withhold response to the no-go targets, are considered as failures of sustained attention, 
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instead of failures to inhibit response (Manly et al., 1999; Robertson et al., 1997). SART 
errors are calculated based on the accuracy rates in withholding responses to targets. 
Another SART measure that is often used is reaction time variability, also known as reaction 
time coefficient of variability (RT variability). RT refers to the time elapsed between the 
presentation of a stimulus and the onset of a response. RT variability represents the variation 
in response times to nontargets and is calculated as the standard deviation for nontarget 
reaction times on the SART divided by the mean of RT. SART errors are interpreted as 
reflecting a drift of attention from the ongoing task, whereas RT variability is regarded as 
reflecting subtle attentional lapses (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a). Thus, increased SART 
errors reflect an increase in failure to maintain sustained attention and increased RT 
variability reflects increased attentional fluctuations. 
The SART has been extensively used in the mind wandering literature to study the 
occurrence of mind wandering in situations that require individuals to maintain sustained 
attention as well as its effects on such a resource-demanding task (Cheyne, Solman, 
Galloway, & Hawkins, 2009; McVay & Kane, 2009; Mrazek et al., 2012; Smallwood et al., 2004, 
2006). Investigations of mind wandering during the SART involve participants completing 
the task and being probed throughout the task or completing a retrospective posttest 
questionnaire to indicate how much they have mind wandered while working on the task. 
For instance, McVay and Kane (2009) had participants complete a modified version of the 
SART task with word stimuli, usually known as the semantic SART (Smallwood, Riby, Heim, 
& Davies, 2006), and probed the participants following the targets. The semantic SART 
presented 1800 words in 8 blocks, each of which consisted of 225 trials with 45 words 
13 
 
repeated randomly. Of these 45 words, 40 were nontargets, animal names, and 5 were 
targets, names of foods. Each word was shown for 300ms and then was followed by a 900ms 
mask, which was 12 capitalized Xs (i.e., XXXXXXXXXXXX). McVay and Kane (2009) found that 
participants made more errors on withholding responses to the targets when they reported 
mind wandering than when they reported on-task thinking. Also, results indicated that 
increased mind wandering was associated with increased performance decrements on the 
SART (i.e., increased failures of withholding response to targets) over time. RT variability in 
responses to nontargets was positively correlated with the number of mind wandering 
episodes. Overall performance on the SART, including both correctly responding to 
nontargets and withholding responses to targets, was inversely associated with the number 
of mind wandering episodes. Performance results on the SART have usually been interpreted 
in this manner in studies using this task (Cheyne et al., 2009; McVay & Kane, 2009; Mrazek 
et al., 2012; Smallwood et al., 2004, 2006). 
Another task that has been widely used to study mind wandering is reading. 
Investigations of mind wandering during reading utilize a similar design in which 
participants read some material and report TUTs when probed and/or when they catch 
themselves mind wandering. Previous studies have shown that mind wandering is a 
common experience while reading and that mind wandering during reading leads to poor 
comprehension of the reading material (Mrazek, Franklin, Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013; 
Reichle et al., 2010; Schooler et al., 2005; Smallwood et al., 2008; Smilek et al., 2010).   
While the majority of studies have examined mind wandering while participants are 
engaged in the SART or reading tasks, a few studies have studied mind wandering while 
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participants are learning from lecture videos (Farley, Risko, & Kingstone, 2013; Risko et al., 
2012; Risko, Buchanan, Medimorec, & Kingstone, 2013; Szpunar, Moulton, & Schacter, 2013). 
Similar to the SART and reading tasks, investigations of mind wandering during lecture 
videos use thought sampling when participants are watching a lecture video and examine 
the effects of mind wandering on the comprehension of lecture video material. These studies 
have also provided evidence for the disruptive effects of mind wandering during lecture 
videos on the comprehension of lecture material. 
Theoretical explanations of mind wandering 
Over the past decade, the literature on mind wandering has surged and revolved 
around four main hypotheses regarding the cognitive basis of mind wandering, namely the 
current concerns hypothesis, the decoupling hypothesis, the executive failure hypothesis, 
and the meta-awareness hypothesis. 
The current concerns hypothesis. As one of the early accounts of mind wandering, 
the current concerns hypothesis is based on Klinger’s (1971, 1999) work on thought flow 
and how task-relevant goals and current concerns alter the contents of a train of thought. In 
this framework, current concerns refer to “latent time-binding states that extend from the 
initiation of commitment to a goal pursuit to its termination” (Klinger, 1999, p. 29). An 
individual’s personal goals, daily life issues, and unresolved problems are examples of 
current concerns. 
The basic tenet of the current concerns hypothesis is that the focus of attention is on 
salient experiences, whether they be internal or external (Klinger, 1999, 2013). Current 
concerns become salient when individuals are preoccupied with thoughts related to 
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themselves during a period in which external events provide relatively less prominent 
stimuli. The salience of current concerns and of perceptual information is determined by the 
priorities and the emotional value for an individual. At a given moment, an individual may 
have various concerns, varying from one’s to-do list for the week to an upcoming vacation. 
During a weekly office meeting, for example, an upcoming vacation may be more prominent 
for an individual if the individual finds the meeting agenda boring or mundane. The 
individual’s current concerns (goals, wishes, or desires related to the vacation), which are 
emotionally more valuable to the individual, could become more salient than the meeting 
discussion, providing the impetus for engaging in self-generated thoughts unrelated to the 
external task – attentively listening to the meeting. Thus, self-generated TUTs become the 
target of attention when incoming perceptual information is not as salient as an individual’s 
current concerns. According to the current concerns hypothesis, then, the mind wanders 
more frequently when the incentive of engaging in self-generated TUTs is higher than paying 
attention to external input. 
According to the current concerns hypothesis, mind wandering refers to a mental 
state in which the content of thought strays away from a current task and focuses instead on 
self-generated thoughts unrelated to the task (Klinger, 2013). What leads to this shift in 
mental content is the availability of internal and/or external cues that may prime some 
concerns about a goal (e.g., planning an upcoming vacation, submitting an assignment on 
time, or checking email) due to the heightened sensitivity of the individual to such cues. 
Responses to these cues may be in the form of overt actions or subjective mental activity. On 
one hand, when the individual is able to work toward the attainment of the primed goal, the 
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individual’s response to these cues will involve taking actions to pursue that goal. For 
example, when reading a paper, an individual may receive a smartphone notification, which 
may provide an external cue for the individual to think about what is new on Facebook. In 
response to this cue, the individual can check his or her smartphone to receive the recent 
updates from Facebook, and thus, attain the goal of checking Facebook primed by the 
incoming notification (i.e., an external cue).  On the other hand, under circumstances that do 
not allow the pursuit of goals, the responses are in the form of mentation. That is to say, 
individuals can only mentally respond to such cues due to the environmental constraints. 
Using the above example, if the individual is taking a test and his or her smartphone buzzes 
to indicate the arrival of a notification, this may prime the thought of checking the 
smartphone for what is new. Being unable to pull out the smartphone in the middle of the 
test, the individual’s response to this potent cue may be to engage in thoughts related to 
checking the smartphone while working on the test. Hence, the individual engages in mind 
wandering rather than focusing on the test.  
Just as the thought of checking one’s smartphone could be primed by external cues, it 
could also originate from internal cues. The individual could feel a desire to check his or her 
smartphone during the test because of his or her interest in finding out what is new on 
Facebook. Having noticed the internal cue (i.e., the urge to check Facebook), the individual 
could decide either to worry about it after the test and continue working on the test or to 
engage in thoughts related to what may be happening on Facebook, leading to mind 
wandering. 
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When the individual’s goal is to sustain attention on the ongoing task, task-related 
thoughts will be prioritized, leading to declines in mind wandering. In this case, TUTs related 
to the current concerns of an individual are less saliently represented than are task-related 
thoughts. By contrast, when the individual’s current concerns become more salient, 
representations of those concerns will be prioritized in the individual’s thought stream, 
resulting in increases in mind wandering. The current concerns hypothesis, accordingly, 
argues that the shift in mental content from thoughts related to an ongoing task to thoughts 
unrelated to the task at hand, that is, mind wandering, is more likely when task demands are 
low and require fewer cognitive resources. Also, the current concerns hypothesis (Klinger 
1999, 2013) suggests that current concerns are more likely to be activated when 
performance costs associated with mind wandering are not high.  
Support for the current concerns hypothesis comes from studies in which the salience 
of personal memories or goals is manipulated before participants perform an experimental 
task. In an early study of this kind, Antrobus et al. (1966, Experiment 3) investigated whether 
experimentally inducing a current concern would lead to an increase in TUTs during a signal-
detection task. Participants in the experimental group were exposed to a radio broadcast of 
music, which was interrupted by a bogus bulletin announcing that the Chinese Communists 
had attacked a US air base and entered the war in Vietnam. After broadcasting Communist 
China’s declaration of war on the United States, the bulletin went on to announce that eligible 
men would be called in for health screening by local draft boards. In doing so, the researchers 
primed the participants in the experimental group to think about the implications of this 
recent news for themselves as well as their friends and families, leading to a more salient 
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current concern for them. Participants in the control group listened to the radio broadcast 
of music for 15 minutes without an interruption. Results indicated that the experimental 
group reported having more TUTs than the control group. More recent studies have provided 
further support for the current concerns hypothesis. It has been shown that priming of 
personal goals during a writing task prior to task performance results in increased number 
of future-oriented TUTs (Stawarczyk et al., 2011). 
The executive failure hypothesis. Based on the executive-attention theory of 
working memory capacity (Kane et al., 2007), McVay and Kane (2009) argued that mind 
wandering reflects an executive-control failure in the maintenance of task-related thoughts 
during a primary task. According to the executive failure hypothesis (McVay & Kane, 2009, 
2010), the generation of TUTs is automatic and continuous with regards to internal and 
external cues. In this account of mind wandering, TUTs are generated and maintained in a 
resource-free manner, which is why they are always available in the thought stream. It is 
executive-control resources that suppress TUTs, preventing them from becoming the focus 
of attention, while at the same time ensuring the continuity of task-related thoughts during 
a resource-demanding primary task. 
Because mind wandering reflects a shift of attention from a resource-demanding task 
to self-generated TUTs, McVay and Kane (2009, 2010) argued that it originates from 
temporary failures in executive control, one function of which is to ensure sustained 
attention on the primary task in the face of external and internal interference. Executive 
control prevents TUTs from intruding into consciousness in a top-down manner and the 
exertion of this top-down control on mind wandering can be both proactive and reactive 
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(McVay & Kane, 2010). Executive control is proactively initiated to maintain sustained 
attention on the primary task and to allocate attentional resources to the processing of the 
representations of task-relevant information in lieu of TUTs. When executive control fails to 
proactively ensure the continuity of task-relevant goals, TUTs intrude into consciousness, 
leading to performance decrements on the primary task because attention is diverted from 
the primary task to TUTs. Executive control is reactively initiated to draw attention back to 
the primary task when TUTs have already become the focus of attention due to temporary 
lapses in proactive control. Therefore, the engagement of reactive executive control is 
necessary to subdue TUTs. Accordingly, the executive failure hypothesis argues that 
executive-control prevents the mind from wandering by keeping the focus of attention on 
task-relevant stimuli and blocking interference from TUTs and that individual differences in 
executive control capabilities play a key role in the propensity for mind wandering. 
As a measure of domain-general ability, working memory capacity (WMC) is used to 
assess an individual’s executive control capabilities and individual differences in working 
memory capacity have been of great interest to researchers in this field (Engle & Kane, 2004). 
Consequently, the executive-control failure account of mind wandering has focused on the 
relationship between WMC and mind wandering. According to the executive-attention 
theory of WMC (Kane et al., 2007), individual differences in WMC reflect variations in 
executive control capabilities and more specifically in the maintenance of task-relevant goals 
in the face of interference. Consequently, individuals with higher WMC demonstrate superior 
executive control capabilities than individuals with lower WMC, because they are better at 
goal maintenance and conflict resolution (i.e., dealing with interference).  
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Based on the executive-attention theory of WMC (Kane et al., 2007), McVay and Kane 
(2010) suggested that individual differences in WMC, and thus in executive control 
capabilities, predict variations in the propensity to mind wander. Hence, according to the 
executive failure hypothesis, individuals with low WMC are more likely to mind wander 
during resource-demanding tasks. Moreover, considering that mind wandering occurs as a 
result of temporary failures in executive control and that this executive control failure leads 
to performance decrements, McVay & Kane (2009) contended that variations in mind 
wandering partially influence performance differences due to individual variations in WMC, 
suggesting that the relation between WMC and task performance is partially mediated by 
mind wandering. 
Both daily life and laboratory studies have provided support for the predictions of the 
executive failure hypothesis. Kane et al. (2007) conducted an experience sampling study in 
which they investigated the relationship between executive control and mind wandering in 
daily life. Prior to the onset of the experience sampling procedure in daily life settings, they 
had college students come in to the lab to complete WMC tasks. Later, the authors asked 
these college students to report on their thoughts by intermittently probing them multiple 
times a day throughout a period of seven days, using personal digital assistants provided to 
them for this purpose. Results indicated that college students with higher WMC had fewer 
TUTs and more task-related thoughts, compared to those with lower WMC during daily 
activities that were characterized by the students as requiring concentration, effort, or 
challenge.  
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In another study, McVay and Kane (2012b) investigated the relationship between 
WMC and mind wandering during reading. For this purpose, they had college students 
complete WMC tasks and perform several reading tasks, followed by a reading 
comprehension test. Participants were sporadically probed during the reading tasks and 
asked to indicate whether they had been mind wandering. In line with the executive failure 
hypothesis, the authors found that higher WMC participants reported fewer TUTs. Also, 
results indicated that there was a significant direct effect of WMC on reading comprehension 
and a significant indirect effect of WMC on reading comprehension through TUTs, suggesting 
that mind wandering partially mediated the relation between WMC and reading 
comprehension. In other words, college students with lower WMC engaged in more mind 
wandering, which resulted in poorer reading comprehension. Furthermore, McVay and Kane 
(2012a) provided converging evidence for the executive failure hypothesis by examining 
mind wandering during the SART. 
The decoupling hypothesis. Attention is said to be coupled to perception when the 
focus of attention is on incoming perceptual stimuli (Smallwood, 2011). The decoupling 
hypothesis suggests that when the mind wanders, attention is decoupled from perception 
(Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Based on the assumption that task-
related thoughts and TUTs require the same domain general processes, i.e., executive control 
(Smallwood, 2011), the decoupling hypothesis suggests that mind wandering represents a 
state of decoupling in which attentional resources are mainly allocated to the processing of 
TUTs, leading to superficial representations of perceptual information. As a result, according 
to the decoupling hypothesis, mind wandering leads to shallow processing of external 
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stimuli and results in performance decrements on the primary task (Schooler et al., 2011; 
Smallwood, 2011).  
The disruptive effect of mind wandering on primary task performance has been 
documented across various tasks requiring different levels of engagement with the 
environment (Smallwood, Fishman, & Schooler, 2007).  In tasks involving superficial 
engagement with the external stimuli, such as a perceptual signal detection task, participants 
are asked to note the occurrence of a target amid nontargets. Although signal detection tasks, 
in which participants respond to targets and withhold response to nontargets, require only 
a superficial level of attentiveness to the external stimuli, performance on these tasks is 
adversely affected when the mind wanders (Giambra, 1995; Smallwood et al., 2004). 
Likewise, mind wandering has been associated with poorer performance on word list 
learning tasks (Smallwood, Baracaia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 2003), which involve a moderate 
level of engagement with the external environment as participants need to encode single 
words for later retrieval. Furthermore, it has been shown that mind wandering during a 
reading task, which requires a deeper level of engagement with the external environment 
(i.e., text), leads to poorer comprehension of reading material (Smallwood, McSpadden, & 
Schooler, 2008).  
Further evidence for the decoupling hypothesis comes from studies investigating the 
relationship between mind wandering and cortical response to perceptual information.  
Event-related potentials (ERPs), derived from EEG, are used as a measure of cortical 
response to external stimuli, and greater amplitudes in ERPs are linked to increased 
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attention to external stimuli (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994). Specifically, the P300 
component of ERPs is used as an index of the processing of task-relevant information.  
In three experiments, Kam et al. (2011) investigated the effects of fluctuations in 
attention to an external task on sensory responses in visual cortex as a function of whether 
attention was directed to task-related thoughts or TUTs. During a simple visual 
discrimination task, participants were intermittently probed and asked to indicate whether 
they were engaged in task-related thoughts or TUTs. Kam et al. (2011) found a greater 
reduction in the amplitude of ERPs during states of TUTs, or mind wandering, when 
compared to states of task-related thoughts. Moreover, results also revealed that the 
occurrence of TUTs was accompanied by attenuation in both visual and auditory sensory 
responses in cortex, suggesting that the dampening effect of mind wandering on the 
processing of perceptual stimuli is cross-modal. Similarly, another study provided further 
support for the reduction in the amplitude of the P300 component during the periods of 
mind wandering as marked by the SART (Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 2008). 
Smallwood et al. (2011) also examined the relationship between mind wandering and 
changes in pupil diameter during a choice reaction task. When participants were engaged in 
task-related thoughts, there was a transient increase in pupil diameter in response to 
external stimuli. By contrast, pupil diameter demonstrated a reduced amplitude of change 
during states of TUTs, providing further support for the decoupling hypothesis that mind 
wandering has a dampening effect on the processing of incoming perceptual information. 
The meta-awareness hypothesis. The meta-awareness hypothesis capitalizes on 
the distinction between consciousness, which refers to experiential awareness of “having an 
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experience” (Schooler, 2002, p. 339), and meta-consciousness, or meta-awareness, which is 
defined as “one’s explicit knowledge of the current contents of thought” (Schooler et al., 
2011, p. 321). Meta-awareness involves an assessment of the contents of one’s thought 
through interpretation, description or characterization of re-representation of 
consciousness (Schooler, 2002). For instance, an individual can be experientially aware that 
he or she is reading a book, but the direction of meta-awareness toward the phenomenal 
experience of reading is necessary for the individual to realize whether the contents of her 
or his thought are related to the book or something else. In other words, the individual needs 
to assess the contents of his or her thought, which may result in a recognition that he or she 
is totally engaged in reading, or that he or she is thinking about something else other than 
what he or she is gazing over. 
The central premise of the meta-awareness hypothesis is that the capacity to appraise 
the contents of thought (i.e., meta-awareness) enables individuals to detect any discrepancy 
between the current thought content and the desired state of consciousness (Schooler et al., 
2011). When the mind wanders, meta-awareness serves as a “higher-level explicit 
monitoring process to take stock of the specific contents of thought and alert one to the fact 
that they have wandered off task.” (Winkielman & Schooler, 2008, p. 62). Therefore, meta-
awareness is pivotal in the regulation of mind wandering episodes and their influence on 
task performance (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006).  
The meta-awareness account of mind wandering differentiates between two types of 
mind wandering: mind wandering with awareness and mind wandering without awareness. 
The distinction between these two types of mind wandering is revealed by the combination 
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of the probe-caught method and self-caught method. During an ongoing task, self-caught 
mind wandering episodes reflect mind wandering episodes of which participants are aware, 
because they can consciously report that they have been mind wandering only when they 
are aware that they are engaged in TUTs. When participants indicate that they have been 
mind wandering in response to a probe, the interpretation is that they were not aware that 
they had been engaged in TUTs before being probed. Therefore, probe-caught mind 
wandering episodes are categorized as mind wandering episodes without awareness, or 
unaware mind wandering episodes. Otherwise, they would have reported that they had been 
mind wandering by pressing the designated key before the probe appeared. 
The meta-awareness hypothesis posits that mind wandering episodes in the absence 
of awareness, termed zoning out, have more disruptive effects on task performance 
compared to mind wandering episodes with awareness, termed tuning out. Previous studies 
investigating the relationship between meta-awareness and mind wandering during reading 
have shown that individuals often lack awareness of mind wandering, and that the effects of 
mind wandering on text comprehension are more disruptive when participants lack explicit 
awareness of mind wandering than when they are aware they have been mind wandering 
(Schooler et al., 2005; Smallwood et al., 2008). Mind wandering without awareness was also 
linked to poorer performance on the SART (Smallwood et al., 2007).  
Other studies have examined the influence of interventions that reduce meta-
awareness on mind wandering. Sayette et al. (2009) investigated how alcohol intoxication 
affected self-caught and probe-caught mind wandering episodes during reading. The 
participants in the experimental group were given an alcoholic beverage while the 
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participants in the control group were given a placebo beverage that they were led to think 
contained alcohol. After the manipulation, participants started reading some excerpts from 
War and Peace. During the reading task, participants were asked to press a key whenever 
they noticed they had been mind wandering, or zoning out. They were also sporadically 
probed and asked to report whether or not they had been mind wandering. Based on the 
results of the study, inebriation had different effects on self-caught and probe-caught mind 
wandering episodes. Participants who drank the alcoholic beverage mind wandered without 
awareness more than twice as often as sober participants. However, there was no 
statistically significant difference in self-caught mind wandering episodes across the two 
groups. Although inebriated participants mind wandered more and thus had more 
opportunities to catch themselves, they were no more likely to catch themselves mind 
wandering than the participants in the placebo group, which led the authors to conclude that 
inebriation impaired participants’ ability to assess the contents of their thought and thus to 
notice that they had been mind wandering.  
In a similar study, Sayette, Schooler, and Reichle (2010) examined the effect of 
cigarette craving on meta-awareness of mind wandering during reading. This study used the 
same methodology as the Sayette et al. (2009) study, but the participants were smokers, who 
were divided into a crave condition and a low-crave condition. Nicotine deprivation was 
induced on the participants in the crave condition by asking them to stop smoking at least 6 
hours before the experiment. Results showed that craving had a profound influence on meta-
awareness of mind wandering: Participants in the crave condition mind wandered without 
awareness more than three times as often as low-crave participants; however, the two 
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groups did not differ in their propensity to spontaneously notice the occurrence of mind 
wandering, suggesting that craving impaired participants’ meta-awareness of mind 
wandering. Taken together, findings from these two studies indicate that interventions 
reducing meta-awareness increase the likelihood of mind wandering while decreasing the 
likelihood of noticing such occurrences. Based on the meta-awareness hypothesis, then, it 
could be hypothesized that interventions that increase meta-awareness, like mindfulness 
meditation training, should decrease the likelihood of mind wandering and increase the 
likelihood of noticing such occurrences. 
Reconciling the four hypotheses: The process-occurrence framework 
While these four theoretical explanations seem to provide relatively different 
explanations for mind wandering, they are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they actually 
attempt to explain the same phenomenon focusing on distinct elements of mind wandering. 
The four theoretical explanations can be reconciled based on Smallwood’s (2013) process-
occurrence framework. The process-occurrence framework provides a distinction between 
how mind wandering occurs and what happens after the onset of mind wandering. The 
current concerns hypothesis, the executive failure hypothesis, and meta-awareness 
hypothesis each provide an explanation for a different mechanism involved in the 
occurrence of mind wandering (activation of salient information for the current concerns 
hypothesis, failure in executive control for the executive control hypothesis, and lapses in 
higher-order monitoring of the contents of conscious thought for the meta-awareness 
hypothesis), whereas the decoupling hypothesis provides an explanation for processes 
supporting the continuity of an internal train of thought after its occurrence. 
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The process-occurrence framework suggests that these four different mechanisms 
may be involved in different times when the mind wanders. Given that current concerns are 
always present, either at a conscious level or unconscious level (Klinger, 1999, 2013; McVay 
& Kane, 2010), they are present even when attentional resources are allocated to external 
stimuli. Therefore, at a moment in which the focus of attention is on incoming perceptual 
information, current concerns are not salient. As the focus of attention starts to wane, 
attention to external input gradually decreases while the representations of current 
concerns start to become increasingly salient. At a point when current concerns and external 
input are equally represented in working memory, if executive control fails to suppress these 
TUTs associated with current concerns and/or the individual is intermittently unaware that 
the focus of attention is not on incoming perceptual information, current concerns intrude 
into consciousness and start to gain dominance over external stimuli.  Thus, the focus of 
attention becomes TUTs and attention to external stimuli continues to diminish. When the 
focus of attention is on TUTs, mental representations of TUTs are prioritized, processed and 
maintained in working memory, leaving little processing capacity for incoming perceptual 
information. This state of mind wandering can perpetuate until meta-awareness is 
reinstated and the individual is alerted that the current contents of conscious thought are 
not related to the ongoing task, or until executive control is reactively initiated to redirect 
attentional resources to the processing of external input. Alternatively, the individual may 
be engaged in TUTs until perceptual information drastically changes (e.g., sudden changes 
in the environment, high pitch sound, or a car crash during a movie). In either case, all the 
alternative accounts predicated by different hypotheses can be said to require the 
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redirection of the focus of attention to incoming perceptual information. Accordingly, as 
attentional resources are redirected to external stimuli, executive control is reinstated to 
suppress TUTs, preventing them from intruding back to consciousness. Consequently, the 
focus of attention is switched back to external input, and thus, mental representations of 
incoming perceptual information are encoded, processed and maintained in working 
memory.  
Because these accounts offer slightly different explanations for cognitive processes 
involved in mind wandering, the literature has witnessed a lively scholarly debate among 
the leading researchers in the field. For instance, the executive failure account has been 
contrasted with the decoupling hypothesis (McVay & Kane, 2009, 2010). The decoupling 
hypothesis’s view that executive resources are used during mind wandering has been 
challenged by the executive failure hypothesis on the grounds that mind wandering reflects 
a failure in executive control and that individuals with more executive resources (high WMC) 
are no more likely to mind wander than those with less executive resources at their disposal 
(McVay & Kane, 2009). These two arguments can be reconciled based on the process-
occurrence framework:  the decoupling hypothesis is concerned with processes that can 
support the continuity of TUTs after the occurrence of mind wandering and the executive 
failure hypothesis taps into how mind wandering is initiated. Thus, the decoupling 
hypothesis provides an explanation complementary, rather than competing, to the executive 
failure hypothesis. 
Regarding the role of executive control in mind wandering, previous studies have 
shown a negative association between executive control capabilities and propensity for 
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mind wandering in demanding tasks (Brewin & Smart, 2005; Geraerts, Merckelbach, Jelicic, 
& Habets, 2007). Specifically, individuals with a high WMC tend to have fewer mind 
wandering episodes during sustained attention tasks and reading (McVay & Kane, 2009, 
2010; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013). This is, however, not the case for nondemanding 
conditions (Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014). When task 
demands are relatively low or the task is automated to some degree, individuals with high 
WMC tend to have more TUTs. While the executive failure hypothesis could explain the 
former finding that there exists a negative association between executive control capabilities 
and propensity for mind wandering in demanding tasks, it falls short of explaining the 
positive relationship between WMC and mind wandering in nondemanding conditions. 
Likewise, the executive resource-competition view inherent in the decoupling hypothesis 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) fails to account for the regulatory influence of executive 
control on mind wandering. Based on the process-occurrence framework, it is plausible that 
executive control can regulate mind wandering in resource demanding tasks. However, it 
can also contribute to the continuity of mind wandering episodes after the onset of TUTs 
when task demands are low. This has come to be known as the context regulation hypothesis 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2015), which suggests that the role of executive control in mind 
wandering changes depending on task demands. Thus, based on the context regulation 
hypothesis (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015), individuals demonstrate greater propensity to 
mind wander in nondemanding tasks, relative to demanding tasks, and mind wandering 
leads to poorer performance in tasks that require sustained attention such as reading and 
listening to lectures, compared to tasks with low demands. 
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Mind wandering in educational settings 
Experience sampling studies demonstrate that mind wandering is prevalent and 
frequent in everyday life (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009). Mind 
wandering also occurs in educational contexts (Bunce, Flens, & Neiles, 2010; Lindquist & 
McLean, 2011; Szpunar, Moulton, & Schacter, 2013). In one of the early studies into mind 
wandering during lectures, Cameron and Giuntoli (1972) probed college students at ten 
randomly chosen times during lectures. Students were asked to report what they were 
thinking about, whether they were listening to the instructor and whether their listening was 
superficial or active. Results indicated that more than half of the students had attentional 
lapses during lectures, with approximately 40-46% of students paying attention at any given 
moment during lectures. Similarly, Stuart and Rutherford (1978) asked medical students to 
report their concentration level across twelve 50-minute lectures. Students were probed at 
5-min intervals during the lecture with a buzzer. According to the results of the study, the 
level of concentration reached its pinnacle between 10 and 15 minutes from the class start 
time, accompanied by a substantial decrease in student attention afterwards.  
Geerligs (1995) used experience sampling to examine whether students were 
engaged in task-related thoughts or TUTs during problem-based small group discussions. 
During the group discussion, students were auditorily probed and asked to report the 
content of their thoughts, which were then classified as either task-related thoughts or TUTs. 
The author found that the prevalence of TUTs was 26% during the small group discussions 
and that these TUTs were mainly related to current concerns about everyday problems. 
Similarly, a more recent study by Lindquist and McLean (2011) investigated the extent to 
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which college students mind wandered during lectures. They probed college students at five 
different times during three psychology lectures lasting 50 minutes and asked them to 
indicate whether they were having TUTs. On the whole, students reported TUTs for 
approximately 33% of the probes. Result also showed that TUTs were more common late in 
the lecture (44%) than early in the lecture (25%). The authors also revealed a negative 
association between mind wandering and note taking during lectures and retention of 
lecture content. In other words, compared to students reporting fewer episodes of mind 
wandering, those students who reported having more TUTs took less detailed notes during 
the lectures and demonstrated poorer performance on the tests assessing the retention of 
the lecture content. Taken together, these studies conducted in traditional college lecture 
environments provide ecologically valid evidence for the prevalence of mind wandering in 
traditional educational settings, highlighting the importance of studying the occurrence of 
mind wandering during lectures and finding strategies to curtail its adverse effects on 
learning and retention. 
In addition to the investigation of mind wandering during traditional lectures, several 
studies have examined mind wandering during lecture videos, which are being increasingly 
used in online educational settings such as online college classes, massive open online 
courses (MOOCs), and flipped classrooms (Szpunar et al., 2013). To investigate the 
relationship between time on task and mind wandering during lecture videos, Risko et al. 
(2012) conducted two experiments in which college students were asked to watch a one-
hour lecture video either alone (Experiment 1) or with other students in a classroom 
environment (Experiment 2), and they were intermittently probed to report on their 
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thoughts – specifically 5, 25, 40 and 55 minutes into the lecture. In both experiments, three 
one-hour lectures on psychology, economics, and classics were used and participants in each 
experiment were divided into three groups with each watching the lecture video on one of 
the three topics. Having watched the lecture video, students were tested on their retention 
of the content of the lecture video.   
Sixty students participated in Experiment 1 and watched the lecture videos in a 
laboratory setting. They reported mind wandering in response to 43% of the probes. Results 
from Experiment 1 revealed that episodes of mind wandering increased in the second half of 
the lecture video (52%) compared to the first half (35%). Furthermore, results also revealed 
a negative association between mind wandering and performance on the retention test such 
that students reporting more mind wandering episodes demonstrated poorer performance 
on the test. Moreover, the increased episodes of mind wandering in the second half of the 
lecture video were associated with poorer performance on the test questions pertaining to 
the second half of the lecture video when compared to the test questions related to the first 
half of the lecture video. Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1 with minor changes 
to when the probes were given and the number of questions in the retention test as well as 
the setting. The results obtained from Experiment 2 were similar to the results from 
Experiment 1: mind wandering and the associated reduction in memory for the content of 
lecture video increased as a function of time spent watching the lecture video. Risko et al. 
(2012) noted that students tended to have more episodes of mind wandering toward the end 
of a lecture video and that those students who reported more mind wandering tended to 
have a lower score on a retention test assessing the comprehension of the lecture video. Two 
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other studies (Farley et al., 2013; Risko et al., 2013) provided further evidence for this 
relationship between mind wandering and time on task and its effect on the retention of 
lecture video content. 
In an attempt to determine what might alleviate mind wandering during lecture 
videos, Szpunar et al. (2013) looked at the effects of interpolating memory tests into lecture 
videos and conducted two experiments in which college students watched a 21-min lecture 
video on introductory statistics. The video consisted of four segments. In Experiment 1, there 
were two groups, the tested-group and non-tested group. A third group, the restudy group, 
was added in Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to rate from one to 
seven how much they mind wandered after each lecture segment and before the final test. In 
Experiment 2, students were intermittently probed and asked to indicate whether they were 
mind wandering.  Following each segment of the lecture video, students were asked to spend 
approximately one minute completing some basic arithmetic problems that were irrelevant 
to the lecture video. After the arithmetic problems, students in the tested group completed 
short tests on each segment, and students in the non-tested and restudy groups were not 
given a test for the segments. Those in the restudy group were reshown the lecture material 
from the segment corresponding to the material on which the tested group was given a test. 
All participants took a final test on the entire video. 
Szpunar et al. (2013) found that compared with the non-tested (both in Experiment 
1 and Experiment 2) and restudy groups (Experiment 2), the tested group reported fewer 
episodes of mind wandering, took more notes during the lecture, and performed better on 
the final test. Results revealed no significant differences among the non-tested and restudy 
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groups in Experiment 2 in terms of the frequency of mind wandering, note taking, and 
performance on the final test. These results suggest that interpolated memory tests can 
reduce mind wandering during lecture videos and engage students in task-related activities 
(e.g., note taking) while they are learning from lecture videos. 
Taken together, the studies reviewed hitherto demonstrate the prevalence of mind 
wandering in educational settings and shed light on its detrimental effects on learning and 
retention. When learning from lecture videos, learners need to focus their attention on the 
content of the lecture, sustain it throughout the video, and suppress external or internal 
interference at the same time (Schacter & Szpunar, 2015). Therefore, it is important to 
determine what might help to minimize the occurrence of mind wandering during lectures 
and thereby facilitate learning for students. 
Mindfulness 
Mindfulness, an English translation for the Pali word sati (Gethin, 2011), is a technical 
word in Buddhism that has been attributed multiple meanings including attention, 
awareness, retention, and discernment (Davidson & Kaszniak, 2015). In a recent review on 
the definitions of mindfulness, Bodhi (2011) noted that mindfulness refers to a family of 
contemplative principles and practices that guide individuals in their journey to happiness 
and that lead to the extinction of suffering and sorrow. In its simplest form, mindfulness 
entails reflexively contemplating one’s own experience, embodied within the body, feelings, 
states of mind, and experiential phenomena. Mindfulness has a long history, rich in 
philosophical discussions. In what follows, however, mindfulness is examined in terms of a 
contemporary conceptualization, in which it is divorced from religious roots. 
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Mindfulness has been a topic of empirical research since its introduction in 1979 as a 
stress reduction intervention by Jon Kabat-Zinn in his Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction 
(MBSR) program (Bodhi, 2011). Since then, there has been an increasing scholarly interest 
in its nonsectarian applications for empirical research in mainstream psychology (Davidson 
& Kaszniak, 2015). In contemporary psychology, mindfulness is conceptualized as a reflexive 
approach to cultivate increased awareness (Bishop et al., 2004).  
Multiple definitions of mindfulness have been proposed by researchers in the field. 
One often cited definition is that mindfulness is “an openhearted, moment-to-moment, 
nonjudgmental awareness” (Kabat-Zinn, 2005, p. 24). Although there is no exact consensus 
in the mindfulness literature regarding what mindfulness fully entails (Grossman & VanDam, 
2011), there are two main approaches to operationalizing mindfulness as a construct of 
interest for empirical research in psychology. One approach defines mindfulness as a mental 
state of sustained attention to and conscious awareness of the present moment (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003). The other approach operationalizes mindfulness as a two-component construct 
including self-regulation of attention, which is analogous to the former operational 
definition’s focus on sustained attention to the present moment, and an orientation toward 
one’s own experiences that is characterized by curiosity, openness and acceptance (Bishop 
et al., 2004). Despite nuances between the two operational definitions, for purposes of this 
research mindfulness can be thought of as increased awareness of and sustained 
attentiveness to the present moment or the here and now. 
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Attention and mindfulness 
According to Bishop et al. (2004), mindfulness involves the self-regulation of 
attention by dispassionately observing and attending to one’s thoughts, feelings, and 
sensations at the present moment. This sustained attentiveness to the present moment or 
the here and now is associated with improvements in sustained attention, switching 
attention, and inhibiting elaborative processing of thoughts and feelings to which the mind 
wanders. 
One of the basic tenets of mindfulness meditation training (MMT) is that paying 
attention to and being aware of one’s thoughts, feelings, sensations, as well as one’s 
surrounding are innate capabilities and the cultivation of mindfulness by putting these 
resources into use when appropriate is a learnable skill (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). Some 
mindfulness meditation practices entail focusing on a single experience (e.g., the breath), 
while other practices are geared toward broadening the attentional field without selectively 
focusing on a single object but instead openly monitoring one’s immediate experience 
(Bodhi, 2011; Davidson & Kaszniak, 2015). To provide further insight into these different 
styles of meditation, Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, and Davidson (2008) proposed a theoretical 
framework that distinguishes between focused attention and open monitoring meditative 
practices.  
In this framework, focused attention meditation involves deliberately directing and 
sustaining attention on a specific object (e.g., the breath). The practice also entails detecting 
when the mind wanders to thoughts, feelings, or sensations unrelated to the chosen object 
(e.g., how little time one has to prepare for an upcoming final oral exam). When mind 
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wandering is detected, the meditator disengages attention from the distracting thought, 
feeling, or sensation and shifts attention back to the chosen object, which is usually 
accompanied by cognitive reappraisal of the distracting thought, feeling, or sensation. Based 
on supportive evidence from neuroimaging studies, Lutz et al. (2008) argued that focused 
attention meditation training not only helps to cultivate sustained attentiveness to 
immediate experience, but it also enhances the development of the abilities to monitor 
distractions while keeping the attention focused on the chosen activity, to disengage 
attention from a thought, feeling, or sensation unrelated to the object of focus, and to shift 
the focus of attention back to the chosen object.  
Open monitoring meditation entails no voluntary focus on a specific object, but 
instead monitoring the changing contents of experience, whether it be thoughts, feelings, or 
sensations (Lutz et al., 2008). Open monitoring meditation, based on Lutz et al.’s description, 
involves maintaining nonreactive awareness of thoughts, feelings, or sensations arising in 
consciousness. It also entails maintaining an openness to automatic processing of incoming 
perceptual information. Open monitoring practice is aimed at the recognition of the nature 
of cognitive-emotional patterns arising in the stream of consciousness during various 
experiences without reactively being involved in such experiences. Thus, open monitoring 
meditation practice cultivates meta-awareness of the present moment, capitalizing on the 
self-monitoring and sustained attention skills initially developed through focused attention 
meditation (Davidson & Kaszniak, 2015). 
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Effects of mindfulness training on attention 
The benefits of MMT for improving attentional control and executive functioning have 
been well documented. For instance, using a pretest-posttest design, Heeren, Van Boreck and 
Philippot (2009) investigated the effects of Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) 
on cognitive inhibition and motor inhibition. The MBCT intervention was an eight-week 
program and participants completed the same measures before and after the intervention. 
Participants’ cognitive inhibition capacity was measured by their performance on the 
Hayling Task, an executive functioning test in which participants listen to two sets of 15 
sentences and are asked to complete each sentence with an appropriate or unrelated word, 
depending on the set. Two dependent measures from the Hayling task were used to assess 
their performance on the task: response latency (i.e., the amount of time that has elapsed 
from the pronunciation of last word to when the participant began to respond) and error 
rate. Also, participants’ ability to inhibit motor behavior was assessed using a go/no-go task, 
in which randomly-generated five-digit numbers were shown for 500ms followed by a blank 
screen for 1500ms. Half of the five-digit numbers were targets consisting of identical 
matching numbers (e.g., 11111) and other half were nontargets consisting of random non-
matches (e.g., 32415). Half of the targets were programmed to turn from black to red at 50- 
to 350-ms intervals after being presented on the screen, which was the no-go signal. 
Participants were asked to respond to identical matching numbers unless they turned red. 
Results showed that the participants in the mindfulness intervention group, whose 
performance on the Hayling task was comparable to that of the participants in the matched 
control groups before the intervention, had significantly fewer errors in the Hayling task 
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after the MBCT intervention. Further analysis showed that the increase in the rate of correct 
responses from pretest to posttest measures was not due to the changes in reaction time. 
However, there were no significant differences in participants’ performance on the go/no-
go task before and after the intervention. Based on these results, Heeren et al. (2009) noted 
that mindfulness training increased the capacity for cognitive inhibition but not for motor 
inhibition. 
In a longitudinal study, Sahdra et al. (2011) investigated the effects of MMT on 
attentional control as assessed with a response inhibition task (RIT). There were two three-
month retreats, during which participants in the mindfulness training group practiced 
mindfulness meditation for six to ten hours a day under the guidance of an experienced 
mindfulness meditation trainer in an isolated retreat setting. In Retreat 1, there was a retreat 
group that received the MMT and a wait-list control group. In Retreat 2, participants in the 
wait-list control group from Retreat 1 underwent the same three-month mindfulness 
training. Participants completed various tasks, including the RIT, before, during (half way 
through) and after the three-month retreat. Also, there was a follow-up assessment 
occurring approximately five months after each retreat. Results indicated that the retreat 
group in Retreat 1 demonstrated better performance on the RIT when compared to the wait-
list control group. The same effect was observed when the control group underwent the 
identical MMT in Retreat 2. Follow-up assessments demonstrated that the improvements in 
RIT performance, and thus in attentional control, were sustained five months after the 
completion of the three-month MMT. 
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Jha et al. (2010) examined the influence of MMT on WMC, specifically on the OSPAN 
performance, among a pre-deployment military cohort receiving mindfulness training, a pre-
deployment military control group, and a civilian control group. The mindfulness training 
cohort underwent an eight-week mindfulness training, while the other two groups were only 
contacted to complete the study measures. All groups completed the OSPAN task before and 
after the intervention. Results showed that there was no significant change in the civilian 
control group’s performance on the OSPAN task and that the performance of the military 
control group on the OSPAN task degraded over time. Performance degradation on the 
OSPAN task was also observed in those participants in the mindfulness training group who 
reported spending little time practicing mindfulness meditation. Participants in the 
mindfulness training group with high levels of practice demonstrated performance 
improvements on the OSPAN task after the intervention when compared to their OSPAN 
score prior to the intervention. Further analysis revealed that increased daily mindfulness 
meditation practice time corresponded to increased performance on the OSPAN task after 
the intervention. Thus, Jha et al. (2010) noted that mindfulness meditation practice may be 
a protective factor for degradation of WMC due to pre-deployment-related factors, such as 
stress. 
Zeidan, Johnson, Diamon, David, and Goolkasian (2010) investigated the effects of a 
short-term, four-day MMT on working memory and sustained attention, as indexed by an 
automated letter N-back task, in which participants are shown an array of letters and are 
asked to respond by pressing a designated key when a current probe letter on the screen is 
the same as the letter shown two items back. When the current probe letter is different from 
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the letter presented two items back, participants withhold respond and do not press the 
designated key. College students were randomly assigned to a mindfulness training group, 
which met for two hours a day during the course of the four-day program, and a listening 
control group. Participants in the listening group listened to the recorded audiobook of J. R. 
R. Tolkien’s The Hobbit during the four two-hour sessions. All participants completed the 
measures before and after the intervention. Results showed that there were no differences 
between the two groups on the number of correct responses, N-back accuracy. However, the 
MMT group, compared to the control group, demonstrated improved performance on the 
extended hit runs, which represent the number of correct responses in a row. Based on these 
results, the authors concluded that the short-term MMT intervention improved sustained 
attention such that students in the MMT group were better able to maintain sustained 
accuracy on the N-back task. Findings from this study suggest that short MMT interventions 
may not necessarily lead to improvements in working memory per se, but may improve 
individuals’ ability to sustain attention. 
Jha, Krompinger and Baime (2007) examined the effects of MMT on specific 
attentional subsystems (i.e., alerting, orienting, and conflict monitoring) using the Attention 
Network Task (ANT; Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002). Alerting involves 
maintaining vigilance or alertness, orienting involves directing attention to specific stimuli 
and conflict monitoring involves prioritizing among tasks and responses that compete with 
each other. During the ANT, participants look at a central fixation point on the screen and 
complete several trials in which they respond to the presentation of a target by clicking the 
mouse keys. Each trial begins by the presentation of the central fixation and then a cue is 
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presented for 100ms, followed by a 400ms delay interval. Afterwards, a target is presented 
1.068° above or below the central fixation. The target stimuli consist of a row of five arrows 
and are displayed until a response has been made or for 1700ms (whichever is earlier). 
Participants are asked to determine whether the arrow in the center of the row is pointed to 
the left or right while fixating on the central point. In congruent trials, the arrows to the left 
and right of the center arrow point in the same direction as the center arrow (e.g., →→→→→) 
and in other trials those arrows point in the opposite direction (e.g., ←←→←←). Before each 
target is presented, one of the four cue trials is presented: no-cue trials (only a target 
appears), double-cue trials (an asterisk appears below and above the central fixation to 
signal the presentation of the subsequent target), center-cue trials (an asterisk appears at 
the central fixation as a warning for the upcoming target), and spatial-cue trials (an asterisk 
appears either below or above the central fixation to signal where the target will appear). 
These four cue trials differ in the temporal and spatial information they convey regarding 
the upcoming target. No-cue trials give no temporal or spatial warning about when and 
where the target, the arrows, will appear. Double-cue and center-cue trials provide only 
temporal information about the upcoming target. Spatial-cue trials signal not only when the 
target will appear, but where it will appear as well. 
Jha et al. (2007) assigned medical and nursing students, who had no prior experience 
with mindfulness meditation practices, to an eight-week MBSR program. There was a control 
group consisting of students naïve to mindfulness meditation that was exposed to no 
mindfulness intervention. All participants completed the ANT before and after the 
intervention. Initially, before the onset of the intervention, there were no differences in 
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participants’ performance on the ANT between the MBSR and control groups. Results 
revealed that the participants in the MBSR group demonstrated improvements only in their 
orienting performance. This suggests that the MBSR program improved participants’ ability 
to direct and limit attention to a specific input or selected object, which is a fundamental skill 
that focused mindfulness meditation training aims to cultivate through repeated shifting of 
attention back to the chosen object of focus (e.g., one’s breathing) when attention strays off 
to other thoughts, feelings, or sensations (Lutz et al., 2008). Yet, there were no differences in 
participants’ alerting performance and conflict monitoring performance between the two 
groups after the intervention. The fact that the MBSR group was not different from the 
control group in conflict monitoring scores may be surprising given the documented causal 
association between meditation and improvements in conflict monitoring (Wenk-Sormaz, 
2005). However, this may be, at least partly, due to the unexpected increase in conflict 
monitoring scores of the participants in the control group from Time 1 to Time 2, even 
though they did not have any attention training. The authors attributed this to a potential 
vulnerability of the ANT to task exposure effects for the conflict monitoring component. Also, 
one potential explanation for why the two groups did not differ in their alerting scores may 
be that improvements in the alerting aspect of attention, which is characterized by vigilance 
and alertness to changes in the environment, may be more amenable to open monitoring 
meditations and thus require longer-term experiences with mindfulness meditation 
practices (Lutz et al., 2008). 
Allen et al. (2012) investigated the influence of a six-week mindfulness training 
program on cognitive control and executive functioning in novice meditators. They 
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compared a mindfulness meditation group, which participated in a weekly two-hour guided 
meditation session for six weeks, and an active control group, which met and listened to the 
reading of a book by a facilitator, on their performance on an affective Stroop task before and 
after the intervention. Participants completed the affective Stroop task while being scanned 
using fMRI, a brain imaging technique used to capture the BOLD activation levels in brain 
regions. The affective Stroop task was used as a test of cognitive control and conflict 
resolution. The affective Stroop task involved a number counting task consisting of 360 
trials, each of which included the successive presentation of a central fixation point, a first 
number display, a first picture display, a second number display, a second picture display, 
and a final blank stimulus. The number counting task required participants to indicate which 
of the two number displays had greater numerosity (i.e., which display contained more 
numbers). Response conflict originated from incongruence between the Arabic numeral and 
the numerosity of the display. Congruent trials were those trials in which the Arabic numeral 
was consistent with the numerosity of the display (e.g., two 2s and four 4s), whereas 
incongruent trials were those trials in which the Arabic numeral was inconsistent with the 
numerosity of the display (e.g., two 4s and four 2s). The interleaved affective images were 
used as distractors and interfered with the performance on the number counting Stroop task 
by requiring additional bottom-up affective processing. An individual’s performance on the 
affective Stroop task indicated how well the individual could suppress response conflict, 
which referred to the simultaneous activation of incongruent, countervailing responses 
(Arabic numeral vs. numerosity).  
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The comparison of the participants’ performance on the affective Stroop task 
revealed that only the MMT group demonstrated reduced response conflict over time, 
suggesting improvement in interference suppression. The fMRI results showed that, relative 
to the active control group, the participants in the mindfulness group had significantly higher 
levels of BOLD activation levels in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex – a brain region that is 
mostly implicated in top-down attentional control and executive functioning (Seeley et al., 
2007). This suggests that the recruitment of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during the 
conflict resolution task was greater for the MMT group than the active control group. Also, 
two other studies have provided further evidence for the beneficial effects of MMT on Stroop 
task performance for experienced meditators relative to non-meditators (Moore & 
Malinowski, 2009; Teper & Inzlicht, 2013). 
The observed behavioral effects of MMT on attentional control and executive 
functioning have been linked to changes in the neural underpinnings of these cognitive 
mechanisms (Allan et al., 2012; Hölzel et al., 2007; Tang & Posner, 2013; Treadway & Lazer, 
2010). Specifically, studies have shown an increase in the activation of the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), which has been implicated in directing attention and detecting conflicting 
information (van Veen & Carter, 2002). Increased activity in the ACC is attributed to the 
exertion of a top-down control to maintain attention on a target in the presence of external 
distractions or trains of thought conflicting with immediate task goals (van Veen & Carter, 
2002). Hölzel et al. (2007) showed that experienced meditators had greater activity in the 
rostral ACC during mindfulness meditation when compared to nonmeditators. Similarly, 
Gard et al. (2012) found greater activity in the rostral ACC when experienced mindfulness 
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meditators practiced mindfulness meditation, compared to the control group, providing 
further credence to the effect of mindfulness meditation on ACC activity. Additionally, 
findings from structural MRI studies provide evidence for structural changes in the ACC 
attributable to meditation practice (Grant, Courtemanche, Duerden, Duncan, & Rainville, 
2010; Tang et al., 2010). 
Together, these findings suggest that MMT could enhance attentional control and 
executive functioning and that brain regions associated with these mechanisms are highly 
recruited and demonstrate concomitant structural changes as a result of consistent practice. 
During mindfulness meditation, individuals regulate attention by selecting and focusing on 
a specific object and redirecting attention back to the chosen object when attention drifts off 
to other thoughts, feelings, or sensations. Attention regulation is commonly practiced and 
developed in early phases of MMT, which are mostly related to the development of focused 
attention. In the subsequent phases of MMT, individuals are more engaged in open 
monitoring practices, observing internal and external stimuli, which can contribute to the 
cultivation of unfocused sustained attention and increased awareness (Chiesa, Calati, & 
Serretti, 2011). 
Recent meta-analytic reviews (Sedlmeier, Eberth, Schwarz, Zimmermann, & Haarig, 
2012; Zoogman, Goldberg, Hoyt, & Miller, 2015) have reported moderate effect sizes for the 
effects of mindfulness interventions (mainly long-term interventions) on attention-related 
dependent variables (?̅? = .32 in Sedlmeier et al. and del = .28 in Zoogman et al.). This indicates 
that these mindfulness interventions lead to substantial improvements in attention-related 
outcomes. While previous studies have provided converging evidence for the benefits of 
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long-term MMT interventions (lasting from several weeks to months), these studies 
necessitate the investment of a considerable amount of time, financial resources and 
preparation, making it harder to investigate the effects of MMT in diverse settings for many 
researchers. Therefore, it is useful to explore whether brief MMT interventions, which 
involve participants engaging in a single mindfulness meditation practice for a short period 
of time (5-20 minutes), can yield positive outcomes similar to those obtained from long-term 
mindfulness-based interventions (Zeidan et al., 2010). Experimental manipulations aimed at 
inducing a state of mindfulness do not attempt to replicate the long-term benefits of MMT, 
but instead are being used to examine the short-term effects of brief mindfulness meditation 
practices on certain dependent variables conceptually linked to mindfulness (Williams, 
2010). Therefore, although such brief interventions may not provide as robust benefits as 
long-term interventions, these investigations can provide invaluable insight into immediate 
benefits of brief MMT and its application to various domains, including interpersonal 
relationships, daily life settings, work environments, education, etc.  
Mindfulness and mind wandering 
Recognizing the potential of MMT as a means of enhancing one’s attentional control 
and executive functioning abilities as well as increasing one’s awareness of the present 
moment, researchers have proposed mindfulness as an antidote for mind wandering and 
have become interested in its effects on mind wandering (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013; 
Mrazek et al., 2012). For instance, Mrazek et al. (2012) reported two studies investigating 
the relationship between mindfulness and mind wandering. Study 1 was aimed at 
disentangling the association between the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS), 
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which is a commonly used measure of dispositional mindfulness, and several measures of 
mind wandering. Results from Study 1 showed that high levels of mindfulness, as measured 
by the MAAS, were associated with fewer episodes of mind wandering. While Study 1 
provided evidence for the notion that mindfulness and mind wandering are opposing 
constructs, the generalizability of the results were limited by the correlational design of the 
study. In Study 2, therefore, the authors set out to examine the effects of an induced short-
term mindfulness state on mind wandering. Specifically, they were interested in whether a 
brief (8-minute) mindful breathing exercise could attenuate mind wandering. There were 
three groups, namely mindful breathing, passive relaxation, and reading. All participants 
completed the same SART before and after the manipulation. Compared to the participants 
in the passive relaxation and reading groups, participants in the mindful breathing group 
had fewer SART errors and lower RT variability, which have been associated with reduced 
TUTs. Mrazek et al. concluded that a brief 8-minute mindfulness practice could reduce mind 
wandering during a sustained attention task. 
Building on the previous study, Mrazek, Franklin, Phillips, Baird and Schooler (2013) 
investigated the effects of a two-week mindfulness training program on mind wandering and 
cognitive performance. College students were randomly assigned to either a mindfulness 
training program or a nutrition program. In the mindfulness program, students were trained 
on strategies to improve sustained attentiveness to the here and now and they were asked 
to practice a 10-minute mindfulness meditation in their everyday life during the course of 
the two-week training program. The authors found that students in the mindfulness training 
program mind wandered less frequently than those in the nutrition program during the 
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reading task. Also, results revealed that the mindfulness training group demonstrated 
significantly better improvement in the WMC task and reading comprehension test used in 
the study, and that this improvement was partially mediated by a decrease in mind 
wandering.   
These studies provide converging evidence that MMT can alleviate mind wandering, 
mitigate its disruptive effects, and improve performance in sustained attention and working 
memory tasks as well as reading comprehension. The positive effects of mindfulness training 
on mind wandering open up the possibility that mindfulness training could be used as an 
intervention to ward off mind wandering in educational settings. However, no studies have 
investigated this relationship within the context of learning from lectures. 
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CHAPTER 2. EXPERIMENT 1 
Studies reviewed so far demonstrate that mind wandering is a core aspect of one’s 
mental life, that it is prevalent in daily life, and that it is associated with performance 
decrements on diverse tasks, including sustained attention tasks, reading, and listening to 
lectures. Given that college students are more likely to mind wander during lectures or while 
studying than other daily life settings (Unsworth et al., 2012), it is important to examine 
techniques that might inhibit mind wandering in educational settings and modulate its 
deleterious effects on learning (Szpunar et al. 2013). In fact, Schacter and Szpunar (2015) 
and Szpunar et al. (2013) explicitly noted that there is an increasing need for studies that 
investigate which strategies can be helpful in reducing the extent to which students mind 
wander during lectures and ameliorate the harmful effects of mind wandering on learning.  
In order to address this gap in the literature, the purpose of Experiment 1 was 
twofold: it was designed to investigate whether inducing a brief mindfulness state prior to a 
lecture video could reduce mind wandering while learning from the lecture video and it also 
examined the role of executive control in the relationship between mindfulness and mind 
wandering. There was a mindfulness meditation group, a listening group that served as an 
active control group, and a no-treatment control group. Participants in the mindfulness 
group listened to and practiced a brief guided mindfulness meditation aimed at focusing 
attention on the present moment by anchoring attention to the breath. In the listening group, 
participants listened to an audiobook in order to keep them actively listening for the same 
amount of time as the mindfulness practice. Lastly, the control group listened to no audio 
material, but instead directly proceeded to the lecture video. 
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To induce a state of mindfulness through brief interventions, researchers often use 
guided mindfulness practice (e.g., Erisman & Roemer, 2010; Taraban, Heide, Woollacott, & 
Chan, 2017; Xu, Purdon, Seli, & Smilek, 2017). In the guided mindfulness practice, 
participants listen to a guided audio recording that encourages them to focus attention on 
their breath and bring attention back to the breath whenever they notice they have been 
mind wandering. The guided audio recording also includes considerable amount of silent 
moments. In a guided mindfulness practice, participants engage in mindfulness practice 
while listening to intermittent audio instructions that serve as reminders. Unguided 
mindfulness practice is sometimes used (e.g., Mrazek et al., 2012). Participants are instructed 
to focus attention on their breath and bring attention back to the breath whenever they 
notice they have been mind wandering. The instructions are displayed on a screen and 
participants practice mindfulness on their own after reading the instructions. Based on the 
assumption that a guided mindfulness practice would enable participants to engage in the 
mindfulness practice more thoroughly than an unguided mindfulness practice, a guided 
mindfulness practice was used in the current dissertation. 
Consistent with the meta-awareness hypothesis, it has been shown that interventions 
that decrease meta-awareness increase the likelihood of mind wandering without 
awareness and decrease the likelihood of noticing such occurrences (Sayette et al., 2009; 
Sayette et al., 2010). Given that inducing a mindfulness state should increase one’s meta-
awareness, participants in the mindfulness group were expected to have fewer zoning outs, 
or episodes of mind wandering without awareness, than the two control groups. Also, from 
a perceptual decoupling perspective, because participants in the mindfulness group were 
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expected to maintain sustained attention on the external task, their comprehension of the 
lecture material was expected to be better than that of the two control groups. 
In addition to the primary hypotheses, Experiment 1 also investigated the roles of 
various individual difference measures including trait mindfulness, mind wandering 
tendency or trait mind wandering, media multitasking frequency, and the tendency to have 
dissociative experiences in the propensity for mind wandering during the lecture video. Trait 
mindfulness or dispositional mindfulness refers to the extent to which individuals 
demonstrate characteristics associated with mindfulness in their daily life. Trait mindfulness 
has been shown to be negatively associated with the propensity for mind wandering 
(Mrazek, Phillips et al., 2013; Mrazek et al., 2012), suggesting individuals who demonstrate 
high levels of trait mindfulness tend to mind wander less during demanding tasks. Therefore, 
it was expected that trait mindfulness would negatively predict the propensity for mind 
wandering during the lecture video. In the same vein, those with a greater tendency to mind 
wander in daily life were expected to mind wander more during the lecture video. 
Media multitasking refers to concurrently engaging in and consuming multiple types 
of media (Ophir, Nass, & Wagner, 2009). It has been shown that heavy media multitaskers 
demonstrate an increased susceptibility to interference from task-irrelevant stimuli during 
demanding cognitive tasks and that they show poor attentional control in the face of 
interference (Ophier et al., 2009). Furthermore, based on findings from neuroimaging 
studies, it could be argued that heavy media multitasking may lead to increased activity in 
the default mode network (DMN; Ziegler et al., 2015), which is associated with mind 
wandering (Buckner et al., 2008; Mason et al., 2007). Therefore, it was predicted that 
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increased media multitasking frequency would predict greater propensity for mind 
wandering. 
Dissociation refers to transient lapses or disruptions in the integration of 
experiences, thoughts, feelings, memories, and actions into consciousness (Bernstein & 
Putnam, 1986). Examples of dissociative experiences include listening to someone talk but 
not hearing part or all of what the person said, getting absorbed in a movie to the extent that 
one is unaware of what is happening around the individual, and feeling as if one is watching 
himself or herself do something from a distance (Wright & Loftus, 1999).  Dissociation is 
mostly conceptualized as a continuum ranging from non-pathological dissociative states 
commonly experienced in daily life (e.g., daydreaming) to pathological types of dissociation 
manifested in clinical dissociative disorders (Waller, Putnam, & Carlson, 1996). The 
Dissociative Experiences Scale developed by Bernstein and Putnam (1986) is a widely-
accepted measure of the frequency of dissociative experiences in daily life (Van IJzendoorn 
& Schuengel, 1996). Given that dissociation reflects a form of detachment from the present 
conscious experience, it can be argued that dissociation and mindfulness are inversely 
related and that those individuals who tend to have frequent dissociative experiences should 
demonstrate lower levels of mindfulness in their daily life. Therefore, it was predicted that 
frequency of dissociative experiences would be negatively associated with trait mindfulness 
and would be positively associated with mind wandering tendency. 
Following are the primary hypotheses, along with their respective research 
questions, that were tested in Experiment 1. 
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1. Does a brief mindfulness intervention regulate the occurrence of mind wandering and 
mitigate the disruptive effect of mind wandering on comprehension? 
 Hypothesis 1: When compared to the control groups, the mindfulness group will 
have higher rates of self-caught TUTs. 
 Hypothesis 2: When compared to the control groups, the mindfulness group will 
have fewer probe-caught TUTs. 
 Hypothesis 3: When compared to the control groups, the mindfulness group will 
retrospectively report having more TUTs. 
 Hypothesis 4: When compared to the control groups, the mindfulness group will 
have better comprehension scores. 
2. Does mind wandering mediate the relationship between WMC and comprehension? 
 Hypothesis 5: WMC will have an indirect effect on comprehension through mind 
wandering. 
Method 
Experiment 1 employed a one-factor between-subjects design with three conditions: 
no-treatment control, listening, and mindfulness meditation. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the three conditions. The primary dependent variables were self-caught 
TUTs, probe-caught TUTs, retrospective report of TUTs, and lecture comprehension. 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the Department of Psychology’s undergraduate 
participant pool. A total of 183 undergraduate students participated in the experiment in 
exchange for course credit. The data for six participants were removed as a result of a check 
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for outliers, following the procedure described by Field (2013). This resulted in a sample size 
of 177 undergraduate students (95 females) with a mean age of 19.8 years old. There were 
59 participants in each of the three conditions. 
Materials 
Demographics questionnaire. Participants completed a questionnaire containing 
several demographic questions. The questionnaire also included questions regarding 
participants’ experience with meditation (e.g., whether or not they have prior experience 
with any form of meditation). Only 12 participants (6.8%) indicated having prior experience 
with meditation. A preliminary analysis revealed that there were no statistically significant 
differences in any of the dependent variables between those participants who indicated 
having prior experience with meditation and those who had no experience with meditation. 
Mind Wandering Questionnaire. Participants completed the Mind Wandering 
Questionnaire (MWQ) developed by Mrazek, Phillips et al. (2013). The MWQ is a 5-item, brief 
questionnaire used as a measure of general propensity for mind wandering, or mind 
wandering tendency in daily life. Greater scores on the MWQ indicated greater mind 
wandering tendency. The MWQ is available in Appendix A. 
Media Multitasking Index. The Media Multitasking Index (MMI, Ophir et al., 2009) 
includes questions regarding various media multitasking behaviors. Due to time constraints, 
a modified version of the MMI including the types of media most relevant to college students 
was administered in Experiment 1. For each type of these media (i.e., watching TV or videos, 
surfing the Web, using social media, playing video games, reading, doing homework, and 
listening to lectures or presentations), participants indicated how often they engaged in that 
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medium simultaneously while engaging in each of the other type of media, using a four-point 
scale. Based on participants’ frequency rating for each type of media, an MMI was computed 
for each participant. Greater MMI scores indicated increased frequency of media 
multitasking. The MMI is available in Appendix B. 
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale. Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS, 
Brown & Ryan, 2003) is a 15-item measure of dispositional mindfulness, focusing on trait-
like aspects of mindfulness. The responses to the scale items were reverse-coded and an 
MAAS score was calculated for each participant by averaging the responses to the items in 
the scale. Greater scores on the MAAS indicated greater trait mindfulness. The MASS is 
available in Appendix C. 
Dissociative Experiences Scale. Dissociate Experiences Scale (DES, Bernstein & 
Putnam, 1986) is a 28-item scale that measures the frequency of dissociative experiences 
individuals may have in daily life. Experiment 1 used a 20-item modified version of the DES 
due to the sensitive nature of the remaining eight items concerned with traumatic 
experiences. A DES score was computed for each participant by averaging the responses to 
the items in the scale. Greater scores on the DES indicated greater frequency of dissociative 
experiences. The modified DES is available in Appendix D. 
WMC task. Participants performed a short WMC task, specifically the OSPAN. The 
OSPAN task is widely used in working memory research (Foster et al.., 2015; Oswald, 
McAbee, Redick, & Hambrick, 2015) and requires participants to solve a set of basic math 
operations while trying to remember a series of unrelated letters. The E-Prime experiment 
file for the OSPAN task used by Foster et al. (2015) was obtained from the Attention and 
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Working Memory Lab at Georgia Institute of Technology. The task was automated and 
participants used the computer mouse to advance to next steps in the test. Participants first 
saw the math operation (e.g., (1*2) + 1 = ?). After clicking the mouse to indicate that they 
have solved the problem, they were asked to indicate whether the answer shown on the 
screen was true or false. Afterwards they saw a letter on the screen to be recalled at the end 
of a sequence (e.g., "L"). Participants completed one block of the OPSAN task consisting of 25 
math problems and 25 letters. WMC was indexed by the OSPAN total score, which indicated 
the total number of letters recalled in the correct position (Oswald et al., 2015). A greater 
OSPAN score indicated a greater WMC. As commonly done in WMC studies, the OSPAN score 
for participants who scored below the 85% accuracy threshold on the math task was 
excluded. This resulted in the elimination of the OSPAN score for 17 participants.  
Audio recordings. Participants in the mindfulness group listened to and practiced a 
brief guided mindfulness meditation recording by Jon Kabat-Zinn (Kabat-Zinn, 2014, track 
1), whose recordings have been previously used in other studies to cultivate a mindfulness 
state (e.g., Hoogland, 2011). This recording is designed to prompt the listener to pay 
attention to his or her breathing and to try to experience the present moment without 
judgment. This guided mindfulness meditation recording was 10 minutes long. Those 
assigned to the listening group listened to an audiobook for the same amount of time as the 
mindfulness training.  Specifically, participants in the listening group listened to a portion of 
the audiobook of JRR Tolkein’s The Hobbit, which has also been used in previous studies 
(Hoogland, 2011; Zeidan et al., 2010). The portion of the audiobook used in Experiment 1 
corresponded to the first chapter of the book and it was 10 minutes long. Participants in the 
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no-treatment control group listened to no audio recording, but directly proceeded to the 
lecture video, instead. 
Toronto Mindfulness Scale.  Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS, Lau et al., 2006) is a 
13-item, self-reported measure of state mindfulness. The TMS was developed to measure the 
state-like experience of mindfulness following a mindfulness meditation practice, and 
therefore, it focuses on state-like aspects of mindfulness, rather than attempting to measure 
mindfulness as a trait. Participants in the mindfulness and listening groups completed the 
TMS immediately after the audio recording, whereas the control group completed it after the 
completion of the WMC task and right before they began watching the lecture video. Greater 
TMS scores indicated greater levels of induced mindfulness state. The TMS was used as a 
manipulation check to assess whether the mindfulness manipulation influenced self-
reported levels of state mindfulness. The TMS is available in Appendix E. 
Lecture video. Given the diversity of the students in the undergraduate participant 
pool, the lecture video chosen for this study needed to be fairly relevant to many of the 
students in the participant pool, but at the same time it also needed to be peculiar enough so 
that students would not have a strong background in the lecture material, eliminating the 
chances that they would score high on the comprehension test regardless of the 
manipulation. Hence, the lecture video chosen for this study was a 22-minute introductory 
lecture on homeostasis taken from an introductory physiology course on Coursera (Duke 
University, 2016), a leading MOOC provider website. The participants were informed that 
they would watch a lecture video and that they would take a comprehension test on the 
lecture material at the end. 
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Dundee Stress State Questionnaire. The Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (DSSQ, 
Matthews et al., 1999) has been extensively used as a retrospective measure of mind 
wandering (Smallwood et al., 2004; Smallwood, O’Connor, & Heim, 2005). In the DSSQ 
participants indicate the extent to which they had various thoughts while completing a task. 
Immediately following the lecture video, participants completed the DSSQ to report how 
often they engaged in the presented thoughts. The average score on the DSSQ was used as a 
retrospective measure of TUTs during the lecture video. Greater scores indicated greater 
frequency of having TUTs during the lecture video. The DSSQ is available in Appendix F. 
Post-video questionnaire. Following the retrospective reports of TUTs, participants 
completed a post-video questionnaire containing questions regarding their interest in the 
lecture video content, their motivation to learn from the lecture video, and their background 
knowledge about the lecture material. The post-video questionnaire is available in Appendix 
G. 
Comprehension test. The comprehension test included 14 multiple choice questions 
assessing the comprehension of the lecture video material. The questions were developed 
based on the lecture video material, considering the objectives of the lecture video presented 
at the beginning, and were piloted with undergraduate research assistants in the lab to 
ensure the validity of the comprehension test. The comprehension score for each participant 
was the proportion of questions answered correctly on the test. No question in the 
comprehension test had a 100% accuracy rate and thus all questions were included in the 
calculation of the comprehension score. Greater comprehension scores indicated better 
comprehension of the lecture material. The comprehension test is available in Appendix H. 
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Mind wandering probes. Schooler et al. (2011) proposed using a combination of 
probe-caught and self-caught methods of thought sampling when one is interested in the 
meta-awareness of mind wandering. In the probe-caught method, participants are 
intermittently probed and asked whether or not they have been mind wandering as well as 
the contents of their TUTs (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). In the self-caught method, 
participants are asked to press a key when they notice they have been mind wandering 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). The latter serves as a means of determining the extent to 
which participants are aware of their mind wandering episodes, while the former provides 
an estimate of the frequency of mind wandering episodes without awareness (Schooler et 
al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Therefore, in this study, both methods were used 
(see Appendix I for thought sampling instructions). Specifically, in the probe-caught method, 
participants were quasi-randomly probed five times throughout the video. The probes were 
presented approximately 5, 8, 12, 17, and 21 minutes into the lecture video. In the self-caught 
method, participants were instructed to press the space bar whenever they noticed they had 
been mind wandering during the lecture video. Participants practiced both methods prior to 
watching the lecture video. The probe-caught TUTs variable was calculated as the proportion 
of probes to which participants indicated mind wandering. For instance, a participant who 
indicated mind wandering to four out of five probes would have a score of .80 for their probe-
caught TUTs variable. The self-caught TUTs variable was calculated as the sum of key presses 
(space bar) throughout the lecture video. Figure 2 illustrates this thought sampling 
procedure. 
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Figure 2. The thought sampling paradigm used in Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival to the lab, participants were briefed about the study and they signed the 
informed consent form. Then, they completed an online Qualtrics survey (Qualtrics, Provo, 
UT; http://www.qualtics.com) that contained the demographics questionnaire, the MWQ, 
the MAAS, the DES, and the MMI. Participants then completed the WMC task. Next, 
participants in the mindfulness group listened to and practiced the 10-minute guided 
mindfulness meditation, whereas the listening group listened to the audiobook for 10 
minutes. The no-treatment control group listened to no audio recording, but directly 
proceeded to the lecture video. 
After the audio phase, if any, participants completed the TMS to report their level of 
state mindfulness. Then they were informed about the concept of mind wandering and the 
thought sampling procedure to be used to capture their mind wandering episodes was 
described.  Having practiced both the probe-caught and self-caught methods and having 
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been told that there would be a test at the end, participants began watching the video. 
Throughout the video, participants were intermittently probed and asked to indicate 
whether they had been mind wandering. The probes appeared approximately 5, 8, 12, 17, 
and 21 minutes into the lecture video. Also, participants were asked to press the space key 
bar anytime they noticed they had been mind wandering throughout the lecture video. At 
the end of the lecture video, participants completed the retrospective measure of mind 
wandering, followed by the post-video questionnaire assessing their interest in the lecture 
video content, motivation to learn from the lecture video, and prior knowledge about the 
lecture material. Lastly, they took the comprehension test assessing the comprehension of 
the material covered in the lecture. After completion of the test, participants were debriefed 
about the purpose of the study.  
The E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) was used to 
present all stimuli and tasks, except for the initial questionnaires. All materials and 
procedures used in the current dissertation were reviewed and approved by the Iowa State 
University Institutional Review Board (IRB). The first page of the IRB approval is available 
in Appendix M. 
Results 
Results from the current experiment are presented in two sections. In the first 
section, results concerning the effects of experimental manipulations are presented, together 
with the results of hypothesis testing. In the second section, descriptive statistics for 
individual differences measures are summarized, along with the correlations among these 
measures and comparisons of these measures across the three conditions as well as the 
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results of various moderation and mediation analyses, exploratory analysis, and some 
structural equation modeling.  
Data analysis was conducted in SPSS and the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) was used 
for bootstrapped mediation and moderation analyses. Also, MPLUS was used for structural 
equation modeling. Lastly, Bayes factors were computed using JASP (JASP Team, 2016). For 
all statistical significance analyses, an alpha level of .05 was used. 
Bayes factors, or BFs, represent the ratio of the likelihood of the data fitting under the 
null hypothesis to the likelihood of the data fitting under the alternative hypothesis (Jarosz 
& Wiley, 2014). As an alternative to null hypothesis significance testing, Bayesian hypothesis 
testing is a comparative approach, in which the fit of the data under the null hypothesis is 
compared to the fit of the data under the alternative hypothesis (Wagenmakers, 2007). 
Therefore, BFs are used to judge the weight of the evidence obtained from the data in favor 
of either the null hypothesis (BF01) or the alternative hypothesis (BF10 = 1 / BF01). For 
instance, a BF of 5 in favor of the null hypothesis, denoted as BF01 = 5, indicates that the data 
are five times more likely to fit under the null hypothesis than under the alternative 
hypothesis. 
Effects of the experimental manipulation 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables are presented in Table 1 and are 
visualized in Figure 3. It is important to note that the mean values for all dependent variables 
were close to each other and that most of the confidence intervals overlapped.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for dependent variables 
 Group  
 No-treatment 
(N = 59) 
Listening 
(N = 59) 
Mindfulness 
(N = 59) 
Total 
(N = 177) 
Self-caught TUTs 
14.19 (11.37) 
[12.22, 17.78] 
17.41 (13.54) 
[15.06, 21.88] 
17.64 (14.15) 
[13.74, 20.91] 
16.41 (13.10) 
[14.80, 18.69] 
Probe-caught TUTs 
.61 (.30) 
[.52, .68] 
.63 (.26) 
[.55, .70] 
.57 (.32) 
[.45, .63] 
.60 (.29) 
[.54, .64] 
Retrospective TUTs 
2.23 (.61) 
[2.07, 2.38] 
2.38 (.55) 
[2.21, 2.47] 
2.35 (.62) 
[2.16, 2.43] 
2.32 (.59) 
[2.20, 2.37] 
Comprehension 
.55 (.17) 
[.51, .61] 
.59 (.16) 
[.56, .64] 
.58 (.21) 
[.53, .64] 
.57 (.18) 
[.56, .61] 
State mindfulness 
1.83 (.81) 
[1.57, 1.99] 
1.96 (.65) 
[1.77, 2.11] 
1.89 (.75)  
[1.68, 2.09] 
1.89 (.74) 
[1.75, 1.98] 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported for dependent variables. Bias-corrected 
and accelerated (BCa) bootstrapped confidence intervals are reported in brackets. Self-caught TUT 
refers to the average frequency of self-caught mind wandering. Probe-caught TUT refers to the average 
proportion of probes to which participants indicated mind wandering. Retrospective TUT refers to the 
average score on the retrospective measure of mind wandering (max = 5). Comprehension refers to the 
average proportion of correct answers in the comprehension test. State mindfulness refers to the 
average score on the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (max = 4). 
 
Correlations among these variables are presented in Table 2 and correlations among 
all study variables are presented in APPENDIX J. As shown in Table 2, all three measures of 
mind wandering (self-caught TUTs, probe-caught TUTs, and retrospective reports of TUTs) 
were moderately associated with each other. The average proportion of correct answers in 
the comprehension test was negatively correlated with the proportion of probe-caught 
TUTs, r (175) = -.34, p < .01, and with the retrospective self-reported TUTs, r (175) = -.28, p 
< .01. 
Table 2. Correlations among the dependent variables 
Measure 1 2 3 4 
1. Self-caught TUTs - .   
2. Probe-caught TUTs .426**    
3. Retrospective TUTs .395** .475**   
4. Comprehension -.106 -.341** -.227**  
5. State mindfulness -.007 .029 .125 .051 
** p < .01. 
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Figure 3. Bar graphs showing the results for each dependent measure as a function of condition: (a) 
the average number of self-caught TUTs, (b) the average proportion of probe-caught TUTs, (c) the 
average score on the retrospective report of TUTs, (d) the average proportion of the correct 
responses on the comprehension test, and (e) the average score on the Toronto Mindfulness Scale. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
e) 
a) b) 
c) d) 
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To test the hypotheses, a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on 
each dependent measure with the between-subjects factor condition (i.e., no-treatment, 
listening, and mindfulness). The results from separate ANOVAs for each dependent variable 
are presented in Table 3. Levene’s test of Homogeneity of Variances indicated equal 
variances among the three groups for all ANOVAs. 
Table 3. ANOVA results for dependent variables 
Source df MS F p η² ω² BF01 
Self-caught TUT        
Between groups 2 220.09  1.287 .279 .015 .003 5.73 
Within groups 174 170.95       
        
Probe-caught TUT        
Between groups 2 .05 .542 .583 .006 .000 10.93 
Within groups 174 .09      
        
Retrospective TUT        
Between groups 2 .34 .984 .376 .011 .000 7.45 
Within groups 174 .35      
        
Comprehension        
Between groups 2 .03 .847 .430 .010 .000 8.39 
Within groups 174 .03      
        
State mindfulness        
Between groups 2 .25 .451 .638 .005 .000 11.82 
Within groups 174 .55      
One-way ANOVA results are presented for each dependent variable. BF01 represents the Bayes 
factor in favor of the null hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1 was that when compared to the control groups, the mindfulness group 
would have higher rates of self-caught TUTs. The results of the ANOVA revealed no 
significant effect of experimental condition on the frequency of self-caught TUTs, F(2, 174) = 
1.287, MSE = 170.95, p = .279, ω² = .003, BF01 = 5.73. Planned contrasts revealed no 
significant differences between the mindfulness training group and the two control groups 
in the frequency of self-caught TUTs, t(174) = .886, p = .189 (one-tailed), r = .067. The 
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pairwise comparison of the no-treatment group with the listening control group was non-
significant, t(174) = 1.338, p = .92 (one-tailed), r = .101. These results suggest that, contrary 
to Hypothesis 1, a 10-minute mindfulness meditation training did not increase meta-
awareness of mind wandering. 
Hypothesis 2 was that when compared to the control groups, the mindfulness group 
would have fewer probe-caught TUTs. The results of the ANOVA revealed no significant 
differences among the three conditions in the proportion of probe-caught TUTs, F(2, 174) = 
.984, MSE = .09, p = .376, ω² = .000, BF01 = 10.93. Planned contrasts revealed no significant 
differences between the mindfulness training group and the two control groups in the 
proportion of probe-caught TUTs, t(174) = -1.01, p = .157 (one-tailed), r = .076. The pairwise 
comparison of the no-treatment group with the listening control group was non-significant, 
t(174) = .250, p = .402 (one-tailed), r = .019. These results suggest that, contrary to 
Hypothesis 2, a 10-minute mindfulness meditation training did not reduce zoning out during 
lectures. 
Hypothesis 3 was that when compared to the control groups, the mindfulness group 
would retrospectively report having more TUTs. The results of the ANOVA revealed no 
significant differences among the three conditions for the retrospective report of TUTs, F(2, 
174) = .984, MSE = .35,  p = .376, ω² = .000, BF01 = 7.45. Planned contrasts revealed no 
significant differences between the mindfulness training group and the two control groups 
in the retrospective report of TUTs, t(174) = .433, p = .333 (one-tailed), r = .033. The pairwise 
comparison of the no-treatment group with the listening control group was non-significant, 
t(174) = 1.335, p = .92 (one-tailed), r = .101. These results suggest that, contrary to 
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Hypothesis 3, a 10-minute mindfulness meditation training did not lead to an increased 
retrospective recognition of mind wandering. 
Hypothesis 4 was that when compared to the control groups, the mindfulness group 
would have better comprehension scores. The results of the ANOVA revealed no significant 
differences among the three conditions in the proportion of correct answers in the 
comprehension test, F(2, 174) = .847, MSE = .03,  p = .430, ω² = .000, BF01 = 8.39. Planned 
contrasts revealed no significant differences between the mindfulness training group and 
the two control groups in the proportion of correct answers in the comprehension test, 
t(174) = .273, p = .393 (one-tailed), r = .021. The pairwise comparison of the no-treatment 
group with the listening control group was non-significant, t(174) = 1.273, p = .103 (one-
tailed), r = .096. These results suggest that, contrary to Hypothesis 4, a 10-minute 
mindfulness meditation training did not increase the retention of lecture video material. 
Lastly, the results of the ANOVA revealed no significant differences among the three 
conditions in state mindfulness based on the average scores on the TMS, F(2, 174) = .451, 
MSE = .55,  p = .638, ω² = .000, BF01 = 11.82. Planned contrasts revealed no significant 
differences between the mindfulness training group and the two control groups in the 
average scores on the TMS, t(174) = .007, p = .497 (one-tailed), r = .001. The pairwise 
comparison of the no-treatment group with the listening control group was also non-
significant, t(174) = .950, p = .177 (one-tailed), r = .072. These results suggest that a 10-
minute mindfulness meditation intervention was not robust enough to induce a mindfulness 
state. 
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Overall there was no evidence that the brief mindfulness meditation intervention had 
any effect on any of the dependent variables. Given that the three conditions did not differ in 
any of the dependent variables, the rest of the analyses were conducted on the entire dataset 
from all participants. Furthermore, a regression analysis predicting lecture comprehension 
from the three measures of mind wandering used in Experiment 1; that is, self-caught TUTs, 
probe-caught TUTs, and retrospective self-report of TUTs, revealed that the probe-caught 
TUTs variable (beta = -.32, t = -3.83, p < .001) was the only significant predictor of lecture 
comprehension, F(3, 173) = 8.30, MSE = .03, p < .001, R2 = .126, R2adjusted  = .111. Accordingly, 
following the data analyses procedures from previous studies (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2012; 
Mrazek et al., 2012, Mrazek, Franklin et al., 2013), the probe-caught TUT measure, which is 
the average proportion of probes to which participants indicated mind wandering, is used 
as the measure of the propensity for mind wandering during the lecture video in the 
following analyses. 
Individual differences 
Table 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the five individual differences 
measures employed in Experiment 1 across the three conditions. As can be seen from the 
table, the mean values of each measure do not differ greatly across the three conditions. To 
check whether the participants in the three conditions differed in any of the individual 
differences measures, separate one-way ANOVA tests were conducted for each measure. 
One-way ANOVA tests revealed no statistically significant differences among the three 
conditions in working memory capacity as measured by OSPAN, F(2, 157) = .98, MSE = .69, p 
= .378, BF01 = 6.93, mind wandering tendency, F(2, 173) = .35, MSE = .69 p = .702, BF01 = 
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12.79, trait mindfulness or dispositional mindfulness as measured by MAAS, F(2, 173) = .459, 
MSE = .55 p = .633, BF01 = 11.68, frequency of dissociative experiences, F(2, 173) = .546, MSE 
= 2.07 p = .480, BF01 = 10.83, and media multitasking frequency, F(2, 173) = .169, MSE = .59 
p = .845, BF01 = 15.01. These results indicate that the three groups were homogenous in 
terms of working memory capacity, mind wandering tendency, dispositional mindfulness, 
dissociative experiences tendency, and media multitasking frequency. The mean values were 
comparable to previous studies for WMC (Foster et al., 2014), MWQ (Mrazek, Phillips et al., 
2013), MAAS (Mrazek, Phillips et al., 2013), DES (Van IJzendoorn et al., 1996), and MMI 
(Ralph et al., 2014). 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for individual differences measures across conditions 
  
Group 
 
 Range No-
treatment 
Listening Mindfulness 
Total 
Working memory 
capacity 
0-25 17.13 (5.49) 
N = 53 
16.79 (5.35) 
N = 53 
18.17 (5.03) 
N = 54 
17.37 (5.30) 
N = 160 
      
Mind wandering 
tendency 
1-6 3.82 (.89) 
N = 59 
3.93 (.81) 
N = 58 
3.93 (.78) 
N = 59 
3.89 (.83) 
N = 176 
      
Trait mindfulness 
1-6 3.95 (.66) 
N = 59 
3.92 (.76) 
N = 58 
3.83 (.79) 
N = 59 
3.90 (.74) 
N = 176 
      
Dissociative 
experiences 
1-10 2.51 (1.41) 
N = 59 
2.65 (1.47) 
N = 58 
2.79 (1.43) 
N = 59 
2.65 (1.43) 
N = 176 
      
Media multitasking 
frequency 
1-6 2.59 (.70) 
N = 59 
2.61 (.85) 
N = 58 
2.67 (.76) 
N = 59 
2.62 (.77) 
N = 176 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported for individual differences measures. 
Working memory capacity, as measured using the Automated Operation Span (OSPAN) task, 
indicates the average OSPAN total score. Mind wandering tendency indicates the average score on 
the MWQ. Trait mindfulness indicates the average score on the MAAS. Dissociative experiences 
indicates the average score on the DES. Media multitasking frequency indicates the average score 
on the modified version of MMI.  
 
72 
 
Table 5 shows the correlations among the individual differences measures across all 
participants. Because the three experimental groups did not differ in any of the dependent 
variables, the correlation analysis was conducted on the data from all participants. 
Table 5. Correlations among individual differences measures across all participants 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Working memory capacity 159     
2. Mind wandering tendency .025 176    
3. Trait mindfulness -.059 -.727** 176   
4. Dissociative experiences .015 .263** -.424** 176  
5. Media multitasking frequency -.100 .361** -.359** .217** 176 
Values on the diagonal indicate the number of participants whose data were included in the 
analysis of each individual differences measure. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
As seen in Table 5, in line with previous research (Mrazek et al., 2012), trait 
mindfulness and mind wandering tendency were negatively correlated, r (174) = -.73, p < 
.01, suggesting that individuals who reported higher levels of trait mindfulness reported less 
mind wandering tendency. Also, self-reported trait mindfulness was negatively associated 
with frequency of dissociative experiences, r (174) = -.42, p < .01, suggesting that individuals 
who reported higher levels of trait mindfulness were less likely to have dissociative 
experiences. As expected, the frequency of dissociative experiences was positively 
associated with mind wandering tendency, r (174) = .26, p < .01, indicating that those who 
tended to have more dissociative experiences were more likely to mind wander in daily life. 
In relation to media multitasking behaviors, increased levels of media multitasking 
frequency were positively associated with the frequency of dissociative experiences, r (174) 
= .22, p < .01, and mind wandering tendency, r (174) = .36, p < .01, and they were negatively 
associated with trait mindfulness, r (174) = -.36, p < .01. Of note, working memory capacity 
was not correlated with any of the other four individual differences measures. 
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The role of TUTs in the relationship between WMC and comprehension. Based 
on Hypothesis 5, it was expected that mind wandering would mediate the relationship 
between working memory capacity and lecture comprehension. Specifically, WMC was 
hypothesized to have an indirect effect on comprehension scores through mind wandering, 
with high WMC individuals having fewer mind wandering episodes, which in turn would lead 
to better performance on the comprehension test. To test this hypothesis, a bootstrapped 
mediation analysis was conducted using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). The 
results of the mediation analysis for all participants are presented in Figure 4. As can be seen 
in Figure 4, working memory capacity did not predict mind wandering, nor did it have any 
direct or indirect effects on lecture comprehension. Mind wandering, however, did predict 
performance decrements on the comprehension test, b = -.19, p = .0001, 95% CI [-.278, -.096], 
F(2, 157) = 8.26, MSE = .029, p = .0004, R2 = .10, indicating that increased mind wandering 
without awareness, or zoning out, during the lecture video led to poorer comprehension of 
the lecture material. 
 
Figure 4. Regression coefficients for the relationship between working memory capacity and lecture 
comprehension as mediated by mind wandering. Working memory capacity is indexed by quadratic 
OSPAN score. Mind wandering indicates the proportion of probe-caught TUTs. Lecture 
comprehension indicates the proportion of correct answers on the comprehension test. See 
Appendix K for additional related analyses. 
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Individual differences in the propensity for mind wandering. To explore what 
individual differences may predict the propensity for mind wandering during lecture videos, 
a multiple regression analysis was conducted, regressing the proportion of probe-caught 
mind wandering on the five individual differences measures: working memory capacity, 
media multitasking index, dissociative experiences tendency, mind wandering tendency, and 
trait mindfulness. The results are presented in  Table 6. 
 Table 6. Exploratory regression analysis predicting mind wandering 
Variable B SE B β t 
Constant -.619 .346  -1.79 
Working Memory Capacity .000 .000 -.006 -.07 
Media Multitasking Index -.013 .034 -.033 -.40 
Dissociative Experiences Tendency .026 .017 .124 1.46 
Mind Wandering Tendency .169 .040 .459** 4.26 
Trait Mindfulness .133 .048 .320** 2.76 
     
R2  .115   
R2 Adjusted  .09   
F  3.96**   
** p < .01. 
 
As can be seen in Table 6, the five-predictor model accounted for 12% of the variance 
in the average proportion of probe-caught mind wandering. F(5, 153) = 3.96, MSE = .08, p = 
.002, R2 = .12, R2adjusted  = .09. Of all the five predictors, only mind wandering tendency (beta 
= .46, t = 4.26, p < .01) and trait mindfulness (beta = .32, t = 4.26, p < .01) significantly 
contributed to the model. As expected, individuals who reported a greater tendency to mind 
wander in daily life were caught mind wandering more frequently during the experiment 
than those who reported a relatively lesser proclivity for mind wandering in daily life. 
Interestingly, however, individuals who reported high dispositional mindfulness were 
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caught mind wandering during the experiment more frequently than those reporting 
relatively lower levels of dispositional mindfulness.  
A close scrutiny of the collinearity statistics of the predictor variables revealed that 
the tolerance values for MWQ and MAAS were greater than .20 (.50 and .43 respectively) and 
that the VIF values were less than 5 (2.01 and 2.32 respectively), indicating the nonexistence 
of a multicollinearity problem (Field, 2013). Interestingly, trait mindfulness and the 
propensity for mind wandering were not correlated, but the multiple regression analysis 
showed that trait mindfulness was a significant predictor of the propensity for mind 
wandering. This, coupled with the fact that trait mindfulness and mind wandering tendency 
were moderately correlated, r (174) = -.73, p < .01, suggests that the MAAS predictor (trait 
mindfulness) may be a suppressor variable in the prediction model (Smith, Ager, & Williams, 
1992; Thompson & Levine, 1997). Suppressor variables are said to increase the variance 
explained by another predictor – the MWQ predictor in this case - by removing the error 
variance in the predictor variable attributable to measurement artifacts and thus they 
increase the predictive ability of the other predictor(s) as a potential explanation for the 
outcome variable. To examine the potential of the MAAS variable as a suppressor variable, 
the same regression analysis was run by respectively removing the MAAS and MWQ 
variables from the model. The exclusion of the MAAS predictor from the model led to a 
reduction in the variance accounted for by the model, F(4,154) = 3.0, MSE = .082, p < .05, R2 
= .072, and in the beta-weight for the MWQ predictor (beta = .269, p < .01). The exclusion of 
the MWQ predictor from the model led to a nonsignificant regression model with no 
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significant predictors, F(4,154) = .406, MSE = .088, p = .804, R2 = .072. Taken together, these 
results indicate that the MAAS predictor does have a suppression effect. 
Individual differences in the effect of TUTs on comprehension. To examine the 
moderation effects of individual differences measures on the relationship between TUTs 
during the lecture video and lecture comprehension, separate moderation analyses were run 
using the PROCESS macro for SPSS with 1000 bias-corrected bootstrapped samples. The 
predictors were centered (Field, 2013). Results are presented in Table 7.  
In relation to the moderating role of working memory capacity (WMC) in the 
relationship between TUTs during the lecture video and lecture comprehension, the 
moderation analysis revealed that WMC, as indexed by OSPAN, did not moderate the 
relationship between mind wandering during the lecture video (proportion of probe-caught 
TUTs) and lecture comprehension. The OSPAN by TUT interaction was non-significant, b = 
.000, [-.001, .001], p > .05. Overall, the moderation model including WMC and TUTs predicted 
9.5% variance in the performance on the lecture comprehension test, F(3, 156) = 5.49, MSE 
= .029, p < .01.  
Similarly, there was no moderation effect of mind wandering tendency, b = -.012, [-
.110, .087], p > .05, trait mindfulness, b = .056, [-.053, .165], p > .05, the frequency of 
dissociative experiences, b = -.038, [-.095, .019], p > .05, and media multitasking frequency, 
b = -.072, [-.178, .035], p > .05, on the relationship between mind wandering during the 
lecture video and lecture comprehension. The variance in the performance on the lecture 
comprehension test explained by the moderation model was 12.4% for mind wandering 
tendency, F(3, 172) = 8.14, MSE = .029, p < .001, 13.5% for trait mindfulness, F(3, 172) = 8.14, 
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MSE = .029, p < .001, 12.6% for the disposition to have dissociative experiences F(3, 172) = 
8.26, MSE = .029, p < .001, and 12.7% for media multitasking frequency, F(3, 172) = 8.33, 
MSE = .029, p < .001. These results suggest that there are no individual differences in the 
influence of mind wandering on lecture comprehension in terms of working memory 
capacity, mind wandering tendency, trait mindfulness, frequency of dissociative experiences, 
and media multitasking frequency. 
Table 7. Moderation effects of individual differences measures on the relationship between mind 
wandering (TUT) and lecture comprehension (COMP) 
   BCI95 for B   
Predictors B SE Lower Upper t p 
Constant .582 .014 .555 .609 42.91 .000 
OSPAN .000 .000 -.000 .000 .28 .784 
TUT -.187 .046 -.279 -.096 -4.04 .000 
OSPAN x TUT .000 .000 -.001 .001 .21 .834 
       
Constant .573 .013 .547 .599 43.09 .000 
MWQ .020 .016 -.013 .052 1.20 .230 
TUT -.226 .046 -.317 -.136 -4.94 .000 
MWQ x TUT -.012 .050 -.110 .087 -.24 .813 
       
Constant .576 .013 .548 .599 44.56 .000 
MAAS -.031 .018 -.066 .004 -1.76 .080 
TUT -.219 .044 -.305 -.132 -4.98 .000 
MAAS x TUT .056 .055 -.053 .165 1.01 .312 
       
Constant .574 .013 .549 .600 44.33 .000 
DES -.003 .009 -.021 .015 -.29 .769 
TUT -.205 .044 -.293 -.118 -4.64 .000 
DES x TUT -.038 .029 -.095 .019 -1.32 .188 
       
Constant .573 .013 .548 .599 44.45 .000 
MMI .009 .016 -.025 .041 .511 .610 
TUT -.217 .044 -.304 -.130 -4.91 .000 
MMI x TUT -.072 .054 -.178 .035 -1.32 .188 
The outcome variable is the comprehension score for all models and represents the average 
proportion of correct answers in the comprehension test. OSPAN represents working memory 
capacity, as indexed by the average OSPAN total score. MWQ represents mind wandering 
tendency. MAAS represents trait mindfulness. DES represents the disposition to have 
dissociative experiences. MMI represents media multitasking frequency. BCI95 refers to 
bootstrapped (1000) 95% confidence intervals. 
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Situational factors in the propensity for mind wandering. In relation to the 
influence of mind wandering on comprehension, previous research has also explored what 
situational factors may play a role in the propensity for mind wandering and its influence on 
comprehension, specifically focusing on interest in the material, motivation to learn the 
material, and background knowledge in the material to be learned (e.g., Unsworth & 
McMillan, 2013). To examine how interest in the lecture material, motivation to learn from 
the lecture video, and prior knowledge of the lecture material may play a role in the 
propensity for mind wandering during the lecture video and in its effects on lecture 
comprehension, confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling were 
utilized.  
The comprehension test was separated into three parcels based on factor analysis. A 
one-factor solution was requested for the 14 questions in the comprehension test and the 
items were rank-ordered from highest to lowest based on the factor matrix so that the 
average factor loading of each parcel would be roughly equal. Consequently, Questions 1, 3, 
4, 9, and 10 were included in the first parcel (Comp1), Questions 5, 7, 8, 13, and 14 in the 
second parcel (Comp2), and Questions 2, 6, 11, and 12 in the third parcel (Comp3). These 
three parcels were loaded onto the same factor to form the lecture comprehension factor. 
Similarly, responses to mind wandering probes were divided into two parcels. The first TUT 
parcel (TUT1) contained the average of first three probes and the second TUT parcel (TUT2) 
included the last two probes. A TUT factor was formed by loading these two TUT parcels 
onto the same factor. Moreover, the two questions for interest, motivation, and prior 
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knowledge were loaded together onto the same factor to form a separate factor for each of 
these domain-specific factors. 
Having formed the latent factors, the measurement model was tested via 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in MPLUS to determine if the proposed model fit the data. 
Table 8 shows the loadings of the manifest variables on the specified latent variables and 
Table 9 shows the correlations among the latent variables. 
Table 8. Loadings of manifest variables on latent variables 
Factor Items Loading SE 
Comprehension Comp1 .521*** .075 
 Comp2 .518*** .075 
 Comp3 .673*** .070 
TUT TUT1 .770*** .066 
 TUT2 .621*** .066 
Interest INT1 .933*** .026 
 INT2 .895*** .028 
Background BG1 .901*** .126 
 BG2 .553*** .093 
Motivation MOT1 999 999 
 MOT2 999 999 
The two motivation items did not load onto the motivation factor.  
***. p < .001. 
 
Table 9. Correlations among latent variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Comprehension .014     
2. TUT -.536*** .059    
3. Interest .575*** -.603*** .756   
4. Background .428*** -.034 .352*** .903  
5. Motivation 999 999 999 999 -.374 
Values on the diagonal indicate the variance for each factor.  ***. p < .001 
 
As can be seen from Table 8, with the exception of the motivation variables, all 
variables significantly loaded onto their specified factors. The two motivation items did not 
load onto the motivation factor and thus the factor could not be identified. A quick scrutiny 
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of Table 9 reveals that all factors significantly correlated with one another, except for the 
motivation factor. Results of the CFA showed that the measurement model fit was good 
(χ2(40) = 46.90, p = .21; CFI = .98; RMSEA = .03). 
Since the motivation factor could not be identified based on the two motivation items, 
the measurement model was run again without the motivation factor. Table 10 below shows 
the loadings of the manifest variables on the specified latent variables for the updated 
measurement model and Table 11 shows the correlations among the latent variables. Results 
of the CFA showed that the measurement model fit was good (χ2(21) = 24.14, p = .29; CFI = 
.99; RMSEA = .03). 
Table 10. Loadings of manifest variables on latent variables without the Motivation factor 
 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Loading SE Loading SE 
Comprehension   
Comp1 1.000 .000 .529*** .075 
Comp2 1.021*** .234 .521*** .076 
Comp3 1.449*** .303 .661*** .071 
TUT   
TUT1 1.000 .000 .758*** .069 
TUT2 1.003*** .181 .631*** .068 
Interest     
INT1 1.000 .000 .914*** .031 
INT2 1.062*** .082 .915*** .031 
Background     
BG1 1.000 .000 .909*** .119 
BG2 .589*** .166 .548*** .089 
***. p < .001   
 
Table 11. Correlations among latent variables without the Motivation factor 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Comprehension .015    
2. TUT -.542*** .057   
3. Interest .585*** -.603*** .724  
4. Background .423*** -.032 .358*** .919 
Values on the diagonal indicate the variance for each factor. ***. p < .001  
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Based on Table 10, it is observed that each manifest variable significantly loaded onto 
its respective factor. Examining the correlations among the latent variables, it can be seen 
that, in line with previous research (McVay & Kane, 2012; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013), 
comprehension was negatively related to mind wandering, r (175) = -.54, p < .001. Also, 
comprehension was positively associated with topic interest, r (175) = .56, p < .001, and prior 
knowledge of the material, r (175) = .42, p < .001, suggesting that those who found the lecture 
material more interesting and those who reported having more prior knowledge of the 
lecture material demonstrated better comprehension of the lecture material. Likewise, mind 
wandering was negatively associated with topic interest, r (175) = -.60, p < .001, but not with 
prior knowledge of the material, r (175) = -.03, p > .05, indicating that those individuals who 
found the lecture material more interesting tended to mind wander less during the lecture 
video. 
Having investigated the fit of the measurement model, structural equation modeling 
was utilized to examine the interplay among these factors. Specifically, a partial mediation 
model was investigated to test how interest in the lecture material and prior knowledge of 
the lecture material affect mind wandering during the lecture video and how these two 
factors along with mind wandering affect the comprehension of the lecture video, with mind 
wandering partially mediating the effects of interest and prior knowledge on lecture 
comprehension. This partial mediation model is illustrated in Figure 5 and model results are 
presented in Table 12. 
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Table 12. Path coefficients for the hypothesized mediation model 
Outcome Predictor β SE R2 
Mind Wandering 
 
   .403 
Interest -.679*** .082  
 Prior Knowledge .211* .098  
     
Lecture Comprehension    .487 
 Mind Wandering -.393* .158  
 Interest .230 .163  
 Prior Knowledge .328* .129  
Model fit: χ2(21) = 24.14, p = .29; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .03. *. p < .05, ***. p < .001  
 
 
Figure 5. Structural equation model testing the effects of interest and background knowledge on 
lecture comprehension as mediated by mind wandering (the average proportion of probe-caught 
mind wandering). Single-headed arrows connecting latent factors (circles) indicate standardized 
path coefficients, denoting the unique variance explained by the latent factor. Single-headed arrows 
from latent factors to manifest variables indicate the loadings of those manifest variables on latent 
factors. Double-headed arrow connecting Interest and Background indicates the correlation between 
the two factors. Single-headed arrows pointing to manifest variables represent residual variances. 
Dotted lines are non-significant. Solid lines are significant. *. p < .05, **. p < .01, ***. p < .001 
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As can be seen from Figure 5 and Table 12, interest in and prior knowledge of the 
lecture material significantly predicted mind wandering while watching the lecture video. 
Specifically, those who found the lecture material more interesting mind wandered less 
during the lecture video (beta = -.68, p < .001). Interestingly, those who indicated having 
more prior knowledge of the lecture material mind wandered more during the lecture video 
(beta = .21, p < .01). These two factors were significantly associated with each other, r (175) 
= .34, p < .001, and together they accounted for 40.3% of the variance in mind wandering 
while watching the lecture video, suggesting that interest in and prior knowledge of the 
lecture material jointly influence the propensity for mind wandering during lecture videos. 
Furthermore, mind wandering significantly predicted performance on the lecture 
comprehension test (beta = -.39, p < .05). Also, prior knowledge of the lecture material 
accounted for significant unique variance in lecture comprehension (beta = .33, p < .05), 
while interest in the lecture material did not. However, the indirect effect of interest in the 
lecture material on lecture comprehension through mind wandering was significant 
(indirect effect = .27, p < .05). The indirect effect of prior knowledge of the lecture material 
was not significant (indirect effect = .083, p = .104). Constraining the path from prior 
knowledge to lecture comprehension to zero yielded a significantly worse fit of the model, 
Δχ2 (1) = 7.32, p = .007, suggesting that prior knowledge of the lecture material accounted 
for unique variance in lecture comprehension above and beyond that accounted for by its 
relation with mind wandering. Collectively, interest in and prior knowledge of lecture 
material and mind wandering accounted for 48.7% of the variance in lecture comprehension 
while watching the lecture video.  
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These results indicate that mind wandering during lecture videos is disruptive on the 
comprehension of the lecture material, which is directly influenced by how much 
background knowledge an individual has prior to watching the lecture video and is indirectly 
influenced by how interesting an individual finds the lecture material. Those who have more 
prior knowledge of the lecture video seem to have the luxury of engaging in task-unrelated 
thoughts without impeding their comprehension of the lecture video. When an individual is 
not interested in the lecture material, the individual tends to mind wander more, which 
results in poorer comprehension of the lecture material. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 investigated the influence of a brief mindfulness meditation 
intervention on mind wandering during an ecologically valid sustained attention task, i.e., 
learning from a lecture video, and demonstrated that the 10-minute guided mindfulness 
intervention had no influence on the occurrence of mind wandering during the lecture video, 
nor on its disruptive effects on lecture comprehension. Based on the meta-awareness 
hypothesis of mind wandering (Schooler et al., 2011), it was hypothesized that the brief 
mindfulness intervention would lead to increased meta-awareness of mind wandering 
(Hypothesis 1) and a reduced likelihood of zoning out (Hypothesis 2). Similarly, it was also 
expected this brief mindfulness intervention would lead to higher rates of self-reported mind 
wandering following the lecture video due to increased meta-awareness of the occurrence 
of mind wandering (Hypothesis 3). Results of the experiment revealed no support for any of 
these hypotheses: there was no difference across the three conditions in the frequency of 
self-caught mind wandering episodes, in the proportion of probe-caught mind wandering 
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episodes, and in the retrospective self-reports of mind wandering. This finding was 
unexpected on the grounds that a similar brief mindfulness intervention, i.e., an eight-minute 
mindful breathing practice, has been shown to lead to reductions in indirect performance 
markers of mind wandering during the SART (Mrazek et al., 2012). 
One potential explanation for why the manipulation utilized in Experiment 1 did not 
produce a recognizable change in mind wandering across groups may be that such brief 
interventions may work for simple, repetitive laboratory tasks, but may not be robust 
enough to lead to increased recognition of mind wandering and decreased likelihood of 
engaging in mind wandering without awareness, or zoning out, during more complex, real-
life tasks that require processing, encoding and comprehension of multisensory information 
(e.g., learning from a lecture video). Another explanation, which is not mutually exclusive 
from the previous one, may be that a 10-minute mindfulness intervention is not sufficient to 
induce a mindfulness state that leads to substantial reductions in zoning outs. Repeated and 
consistent practice may be needed to observe substantial improvements in the capacity to 
appraise the contents of thought and in the ability to focus attention. The latter explanation 
is substantiated by the fact that the manipulation check, which involved participants 
completing the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS), revealed no significant differences across 
the three groups in state mindfulness levels, suggesting that the mindfulness manipulation 
might not have influenced state mindfulness levels. This conclusion should be taken with a 
grain of salt on the grounds that some methodological challenges have been raised regarding 
the use of self-reported measures, such as TMS, to assess state-like aspects of mindfulness 
(Baer, 2011; Davidson & Kaszniak, 2015). Baer (2011) and Davison and Kaszniak (2015) 
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pointed out that mindfulness-naïve participants may not be able to reflect accurately on their 
current state of being and how mindful they are at the present moment via self-reported 
measures because of their unfamiliarity with recognizing their engagement in the present 
moment, which is in fact deemed a skill cultivated through mindfulness practice.  
In line with the decoupling hypothesis (Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 
2006), it was hypothesized that the brief mindfulness meditation practice would lead to 
better comprehension of the lecture material, as the participants in the mindfulness 
meditation group were expected to maintain sustained attention on the external task, and 
thus, they would spend less time in the perceptual decoupling state leading to poor 
performance on the ongoing task (Hypothesis 4). This hypothesis was not supported either. 
This null finding related to the fourth hypothesis could be explained by the null findings 
related to the previous hypotheses, which demonstrated that the brief mindfulness 
meditation practice produced no substantial changes in mind wandering. The manipulation 
had no effect on mind wandering, nor did it affect the comprehension of the lecture video. 
The second question that guided Experiment 1 was concerned with the mediating 
role of mind wandering in the relationship between working memory capacity and lecture 
comprehension. Specifically, based on the executive failure hypothesis (McVay & Kane, 2009, 
2010), it was expected that high WMC individuals would have fewer mind wandering 
episodes and thus demonstrate better comprehension of the lecture video material 
(Hypothesis 5). While there was no predictive effect of WMC on mind wandering and lecture 
comprehension, mind wandering during lecture videos predicted performance decrements 
on the comprehension of lecture material, providing further credence for the well-
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documented disruptive effect of mind wandering on task performance (e.g., McVay & Kane, 
2012; Mrazek, Franklin et al., 2013; Smallwood, Fishman et al. 2007; Smallwood, McSpadden, 
Luus, & Schooler, 2008; Reichle et al., 2010; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013; Szpunar et al., 
2013). Based on the perceptual decoupling account of mind wandering, those individuals 
who mind wander more frequently during lectures spend more time in the decoupled state, 
during which attention is decoupled from the processing of perceptual stimuli and instead is 
focused on the self-generated TUTs (Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
When decoupling occurs, participants fail to build a situation model of the lecture material 
being covered during TUTs, resulting in poorer comprehension of the lecture material. 
It should be noted that Experiment 1 used a shortened version of the OSPAN task. Due 
to time constraints, participants completed only one block of the OSPAN task. The mean 
OSPAN total scores were typical and comparable to those reported in previous studies using 
the same task (e.g., Foster et al., 2014). However, Foster et al. (2014) have recently suggested 
that use of a shortened test poses a potential threat to the validity of this task in 
approximating WMC. Therefore, the fact that this study used only one block of the OSPAN 
task may be the reason for why WMC did not account for any of the variance in the 
proportion of probe-caught TUTs, leading to null findings regarding the role of WMC in the 
propensity for mind wandering. These null findings are contrary to previous research on the 
effect of WMC on the propensity for mind wandering during a demanding task (e.g., McVay 
& Kane, 2012) and should be cautiously interpreted in light of this limitation. Future research 
could address this limitation by using the full, three-block version of the OSPAN task, which 
on average takes approximately 30 minutes to complete, or using a one-block version of the 
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OSPAN task and a one-block version of the symmetry span task, which also on average takes 
approximately 30 minutes to complete (Foster et al., 2014). The latter combination of the 
OSPAN task with the symmetry span task explains an additional 14.9% of the variance in 
fluid intelligence and is recommended as a better alternative to the three-block version of 
the OSPAN task (Foster et al., 2014). 
In relation to the influence of mind wandering on comprehension, previous research 
has also explored what situational factors may play a role in the propensity for mind 
wandering and its influence on comprehension, specifically focusing on interest in the 
material, motivation to learn the material, and background knowledge in the material to be 
learned (e.g., Unsworth & McMillan, 2013). Therefore, Experiment 1 also investigated how 
interest in the lecture material, motivation to learn from the lecture video and prior 
knowledge of the lecture material may play a role in the propensity for mind wandering 
during the lecture video and in its effects on comprehension. The results from structural 
equation modeling revealed that interest in and prior knowledge of the lecture material 
contributed to mind wandering while watching the lecture video. Specifically, those who 
found the lecture material covered in the video more interesting mind wandered less during 
the lecture video, which is in line with previous studies examining the relationship between 
topic interest and mind wandering (Hollis & Was, 2014; Lindquist & McLean, 2011; 
Unsworth & McMillan, 2013) and those who indicated having more prior knowledge of the 
lecture material mind wandered more during the lecture video. 
Furthermore, structural equation modeling showed that mind wandering accounted 
for performance decrements on the lecture comprehension test, providing further evidence 
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for the well-established disruptive effect of mind wandering on task performance, as 
discussed earlier. These results illustrate that mind wandering during lecture videos is 
disruptive on the comprehension of the lecture material, which is directly influenced by how 
much background knowledge an individual has prior to watching the lecture video and is 
indirectly influenced by how interesting an individual finds the lecture material. Those who 
have more prior knowledge of the lecture video seem to have the luxury of engaging in task-
unrelated thoughts without impeding their comprehension of the lecture video. When an 
individual is not interested in the lecture material, the individual tends to mind wander 
more, which results in poorer comprehension of the lecture material. 
To explore individual differences in the propensity for mind wandering during the 
lecture video, Experiment 1 mainly focused on working memory capacity, media 
multitasking index, frequency of dissociative experiences, mind wandering tendency, and 
trait mindfulness. Of these five individual differences measures, only mind wandering 
tendency and trait mindfulness significantly predicted the propensity for mind wandering 
during the lecture video. As expected, individuals who reported a greater tendency to mind 
wander in daily life were caught mind wandering more frequently during the experiment 
than those who reported a lower frequency of mind wandering in daily life, which lends 
further support to the association between the frequency of mind wandering in daily life and 
the propensity for mind wandering during laboratory tasks and to the convergent validity of 
the self-reported measure of the frequency of mind wandering, the MWQ (Mrazek, Phillips 
et al., 2013). Interestingly, however, individuals who reported high trait mindfulness were 
caught mind wandering during the experiment more frequently than those reporting 
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relatively lower levels of trait mindfulness. This finding may be perceived as contradictory 
to the early conceptualization of the association between trait mindfulness and the 
propensity for mind wandering during a demanding task (i.e., Mrazek et al., 2012); 
nevertheless, further scrutiny of the multiple regression model showed that the trait 
mindfulness variable was a suppressor variable that increased the predictive utility of the 
mind wandering tendency variable as an approximation for the propensity for mind 
wandering, rather than being an actual predictor itself. Therefore, the results of Experiment 
1 regarding the predictive utility of trait mindfulness on the propensity for mind wandering 
are inconclusive. 
Little is known about the role of trait mindfulness as a predictor of the propensity for 
mind wandering during a demanding task. Mrazek et al. (2012) found that trait mindfulness 
was negatively associated with the propensity for mind wandering during the SART, but did 
not report whether it predicted the propensity for mind wandering. Likewise, Mrazek, 
Franklin et al. (2013) provided further evidence for the negative association between trait 
mindfulness and the propensity for mind wandering this time during reading. The authors 
also found that trait mindfulness did not predict the propensity for mind wandering – only 
mind wandering tendency did, congruent with the current experiment. The lack of cogent 
evidence for the relationship between trait mindfulness and the propensity for mind 
wandering during demanding tasks may be attributed to the use of the MAAS as a measure 
of trait mindfulness. In spite of having been widely used as an indication of trait mindfulness, 
the MAAS may be limited in its conceptualization of mindfulness as a trait-like attribute as 
pointed out by Van Dam, Earleywine, and Borders (2010) and therefore may fall short of 
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reflecting the contemporary conceptualizations of trait mindfulness. As a result the MAAS 
may not be a valid measure of trait mindfulness. This presents a fruitful area of study for 
future research on the development and validation of a measure of trait mindfulness based 
on the contemporary conceptualizations of mindfulness. 
A further investigation into the five individual differences measures with respect to 
their moderating roles in the influence of mind during the lecture video on the 
comprehension of lecture material revealed no individual differences in the influence of 
mind wandering on lecture comprehension in terms of working memory capacity, mind 
wandering tendency, trait mindfulness, frequency of dissociative experiences, and media 
multitasking frequency. 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that the brief, 10-minute mindfulness intervention did 
not reduce mind wandering during the lecture video as might be expected from the results 
of Mrazek et al. (2012). Mrazek et al. showed that a similar brief, 8-minute mindfulness 
intervention could reduce performance markers of mind wandering during the SART. It may 
be that brief mindfulness interventions are effective in reducing mind wandering during 
such repetitive, laboratory tasks as the SART, but they may not be strong enough to induce a 
state of mindfulness that could enhance attentional control and reduce mind wandering 
during real-life sustained attention tasks (e.g., watching a lecture video). Experiment 2 was 
designed to examine whether this might be the case.
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CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 1 revealed null findings regarding the hypothesized beneficial influence 
of the 10-minute mindfulness intervention prior to watching the lecture video on mind 
wandering during the lecture video and on its deleterious effects on lecture comprehension. 
The lack of an effect was unexpected given that a similar brief mindfulness meditation 
practice (8 minutes long) has been shown to lead to reductions in indirect performance 
markers of mind wandering during the SART (Mrazek et al., 2012). As described earlier, the 
SART is a go/no-go sustained attention task that requires participants to respond to 
frequently-presented go stimuli (e.g., letters or digits), referred to as nontargets, and to 
withhold response to no-go stimuli, referred to as targets (Robertson et al., 1997). When 
compared to nontargets, targets occur rarely. For instance, in a typical SART containing 240 
trials, only 16 trials are targets. Two indices from the SART have been widely used as 
performance markers of mind wandering. The first index, SART errors, represents failures 
to refrain from responding to no-go stimuli, or targets. The second index, reaction time 
variability or RT CV, represents the variability in response times to go stimuli, or nontargets. 
SART errors are regarded as reflecting a drift of attention from the immediate task, whereas 
RT CV is interpreted as reflecting subtle attentional fluctuations (Cheyne et al., 2009; McVay 
& Kane, 2009; Mrazek et al., 2012). 
Experiment 2 was modeled on Experiment 1, but it employed the SART as the 
attention-demanding task rather than a lecture video.  It was designed as a conceptual 
replication of Mrazek et al. (2012, Study 2) and investigated whether the brief, guided 
mindfulness intervention could reduce mind wandering during the SART.  It was 
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hypothesized that the brief mindfulness intervention would lead to reductions in 
performance indices of mind wandering during the SART, when compared to the control 
group.  Because there was no difference between the listening and the no-treatment control 
groups in Experiment 1, only the listening group was used in Experiment 2.  Also, to shorten 
the entire procedure, the OSPAN task was not used. 
Method 
Experiment 2 employed a one-factor between-subjects design with two conditions: 
listening and mindfulness meditation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
conditions. The primary dependent variables were SART errors and RT CV. 
Participants 
The sample size was calculated based on the effect size of the mindfulness meditation 
manipulation from Mrazek et al. (2012), compared to the two other conditions in the study 
(d = .77). A power analysis for differences between two independent means (mindfulness 
meditation vs. listening) was conducted in GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2013). 
The effect size was set at .77, input power at .80, alpha at .05, and allocation ratio (n2/n1) at 
1. Results indicated that the total sample size would need to be 44 (22 participants in each 
group) to detect the effect with 80% power. 
Participants were recruited from the Department of Psychology’s undergraduate 
participant pool. Fifty-six students (38 females), with a mean age of 19.1 years old, 
participated in the experiment in exchange for course credit. There were 28 participants in 
each condition. 
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Materials 
Experiment 2 used most of the materials from Experiment 1. Specifically, participants 
completed the same demographics questionnaire, MWQ, MMI, MAAS, DES, TMS, and the 
retrospective measure of mind wandering. The same audio recordings as in Experiment 1 
were used in Experiment 2. Different from Experiment 1, the OSPAN task was not 
administered in Experiment 2. The experimental task of watching a lecture video in 
Experiment 1 was replaced with the SART. Similar to Mrazek et al. (2012), mind wandering 
probes were not used in Experiment 2. Instead, participants completed the retrospective 
measure of mind wandering immediately after the completion of the SART. 
As discussed earlier, the SART is a go/no-go sustained attention task in which 
participants are shown an array of visual stimuli of a single category and are asked to 
respond to nontargets and to withhold response to targets. For Experiment 2, the SART 
experiment file used in Mrazek et al. (2012) was obtained from the corresponding author. In 
this version of the SART, nontargets, or go stimuli, were the capital letter O and targets, or 
no-go stimuli, were the capital letter Q. Participants were asked to make a response as fast 
as possible to O’s, which were frequently presented, and to withhold response to Q’s, which 
were rarely presented. The SART used in Mrazek et al. (2012) was composed of 240 stimuli 
and was completed in 10 minutes. To make the experimental task used in Experiment 2 
match the experimental task used in Experiment 1 in terms of duration, the SART was 
modified to last for 20 minutes. This modification resulted in a total of 480 stimuli, 432 of 
which were nontargets (i.e., O). The remaining 48 stimuli were targets (i.e., Q). The 
presentation time was two seconds for all stimuli with a mask of 500 ms (i.e., a smaller 
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square within a larger square). The SART was divided into eight blocks of 60 stimuli, with 54 
nontargets and 6 targets in each. The targets were quasi-randomly dispersed within each 
block.  
 
Figure 6. Example SART trials. The capital Os are nontargets and the capital Q is a target. Each 
stimulus was displayed for two seconds, followed by an interstimulus mask (i.e., a smaller square 
within larger square) shown for 500ms. 
Procedures 
Experiment 2 followed the same procedures as Experiment 1 except that no OSPAN 
task was administered, there were only two conditions (listening and mindfulness 
meditation), and the video task was replaced with a 20-minute version of the SART. Upon 
arrival to the lab, participants were briefed about the study and they completed an online 
Qualtrics survey that contained the demographics questionnaire, the MWQ, the MAAS, the 
96 
 
DES, and the MMI. Next, participants in the mindfulness group listened to and practiced the 
10-minute guided mindfulness meditation, whereas the listening group listened to the 
audiobook for 10 minutes. After the audio phase, participants completed the TMS to report 
their level of state mindfulness. As in Experiment 1, the TMS was used as a manipulation 
check to assess whether the mindfulness manipulation influenced self-reported levels of 
state mindfulness. Then they were informed about the SART. Participants were asked to 
press the space key bar as quickly as possible when the letter was a capital O and to refrain 
from responding when the letter was a capital Q. Having completed 20 practice trials, 
participants began completing the SART. Immediately after the completion of the SART, 
participants completed the retrospective measure of mind wandering. At the end of the 
experiment, participants were debriefed about the purpose of the study.  
Results 
Following the descriptions of SART indices of mind wandering as proposed by Cheyne 
et al. (2009), failures to withhold response to NOGO stimuli were counted as SART (NOGO) 
errors, and RT CV was calculated as the standard deviation of RT to GO Stimuli divided by 
the mean RT to GO stimuli (see Appendix L for bar graphs of SART performance markers). 
Collectively, these indices reflect two types of task disengagement. Specifically, SART errors, 
or failures to withhold response to targets, indicate failures of sustained attention. RT CV 
indicates the variations in the speed of responses to stimuli and increased variability in 
response times indicates fluctuations in attention. Both indices reflect a state of generic task 
inattention characterized by diminished processing of perceptual input and automatic 
responding (Cheyne et al., 2009; Mrazek et al., 2012; Smallwood et al., 2008). Increased SART 
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errors and RT CV are interpreted as reflective of states of mind wandering. Bar graphs for 
state mindfulness levels as indexed by the TMS, SART errors, RT CV, and retrospective report 
of TUTs are presented in Figure 7. 
As shown in Figure 7, mean values for SART errors, RT CV, retrospective self-reports 
of mind wandering, and state mindfulness levels across the two groups were close to each 
other and the confidence intervals substantially overlapped. A correlational analysis 
revealed that SART errors were positively associated with RT CV, r (54) = .30, p < .05, and 
with retrospective self-reports of TUTs, r (54) = .36, p < .01. RT CV and retrospective self-
reports of TUTs were not significantly associated, r (54) = .08, p = .571. 
To examine the effect of the brief mindfulness intervention on state mindfulness, the 
two groups’ scores on the state mindfulness measure (i.e., the TMS) were compared via an 
independent-samples t test, which served as a manipulation check. Results revealed that the 
mindfulness group (M = 2.27, SD = .695) did not differ from the listening group (M = 2.10, SD 
= .523) in the level of state mindfulness as indexed by the average score on the TMS, t(54) = 
1.04, p = .153, BF01 = 1.44. 
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Figure 7. Bar graphs showing the results for each dependent variable as a function of condition: (a) 
the average number of SART Errors, (b) the average Reaction Time Coefficient of Variability, RT CV, 
which was calculated by dividing the standard deviation of RT by the mean RT, (c) the average score 
(1-5) on the retrospective report of TUTs, and (d) the average score on the Toronto Mindfulness 
Scale. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The difference is not statistically significant in 
any of the graphs. The average number of SART errors and the average RT CV were comparable to 
those reported in Mrazek et al. (2012). 
To examine the effects of the brief mindfulness intervention on the two SART indices 
of mind wandering, an independent-samples t test was run on each of the dependent 
variables. There was no significant difference between the mindfulness group (M = 10.71, SD 
= 6.92) and the listening group (M = 9.71, SD = 7.97) in the average number of SART errors, 
t(54) = .50, p = .309, BF01 = 5.14.  There was no significant difference between the 
a) b) 
c) d) 
99 
 
mindfulness group (M = .308, SD = .115) and the listening group (M = .329, SD = .112) in RT 
CV, t(54) = -.716, p = .239, BF01 = 2.02. There was no significant difference between the 
mindfulness group (M = 2.82, SD = .723) and the listening group (M = 2.64, SD = .870) in the 
average frequency of retrospectively reported TUTs, t(54) = .84 , p = .204, BF01 = 6.16. These 
results suggest that, contrary to prediction,  the brief, 10-minute guided mindfulness 
intervention did not reduce mind wandering during the SART. 
To further examine whether the increased 20-minute duration of the SART in the 
current experiment, as opposed to the 10-minute version of the SART used in Mrazek et al. 
(2012), might have precluded the replication of the effect, the SART was divided into two 
halves of 10 minutes. SART errors and RT CV values were calculated for the first half of the 
SART so that the comparisons in the current experiment matched exactly those of Mrazek et 
al. Next, an independent-samples t test was conducted to compare SART errors and RT CV 
for the first 10 minute of the SART between the mindfulness and listening groups. There was 
no significant difference between the mindfulness group (M = 3.82, SD = 2.93) and the 
listening group (M = 3.93, SD = 4.33) in the average number of 10-minute-SART errors, t(54) 
= -.108, p = .457, BF01 = 3.42.  There was no significant difference between the mindfulness 
group (M = .270, SD = .097) and the listening group (M = .298, SD = .111) in RT CV during the 
first 10 minutes of the SART, t(54) = -1.03, p = .155, BF01 = 1.45. These results suggest that 
the brief mindfulness intervention led to no substantial reductions in mind wandering 
during the first 10 minutes of the SART either, ruling out the possibility of the doubled 
duration of the SART affecting the results.  
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A pair-wise comparison of performance indices in the first and second halves of the 
SART revealed that SART errors increased, t(55) = -5.72, p < .001, BF10 > 200, between the 
first 10-minute portion of the SART (M = 3.88, SD = 3.66) and the second 10-minute portion 
of the SART (M = 6.34, SD = 4.39). Likewise, the analysis showed that RT CV increased, t(55) 
= -4.85, p < .001, BF10 > 200, between the first 10-minute portion of the SART (M = .284, SD 
= .104) and the second 10-minute portion of the SART (M = .342, SD = .136). These results 
suggest that mind wandering increased as a function of time on task, as is typically found. 
The previous analysis was further broken down to the level of task blocks. As pointed 
out earlier, the SART was composed of eight blocks of 60 trials.  To examine the effect of 
condition and task block on SART errors and RT CV, a mixed ANOVA was conducted, entering 
task block as a within-subject repeated-measures factor with eight levels and condition as a 
between-subject factor. 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for both 
SART errors, χ2(27) = 48.56, p < .01, and RT CV, χ2(27) = 114.30, p < .001. Therefore, degrees 
of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (SART errors: 
ε = .80, RT CV: ε = .56). The results showed that there were significant differences in the 
performance markers of mind wandering as a function of time on task, as indicated by a 
statistically significant main effect of task block in a repeated-measures ANOVA on both 
SART errors, F(5.57, 300.86) = 13.94, MSE = 1.06, p < .001, η² = .205, BF10 > 200, and on RT 
CV, F(3.89, 210.05) = 17.67, MSE = .011, p < .001, η²= .247, BF10 > 200. However, there was 
no significant effect of condition either on SART errors, F(1, 54) = .251, MSE = 6.96, p = .618, 
or on RT CV, F(1, 54) = .367, MSE = .103, p = .547. Likewise, there was no significant 
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interaction between condition and task block either for SART errors, F(5.57, 300.86) = 1.93, 
p = .082, or for RT CV, F(3.89, 210.05) = .385, p = .814. 
Polynomial within-subject contrasts revealed a linear trend for the increase of SART 
errors, F(1, 54) = 56.43, MSE = 1.27, p < .001, and RT CV, F(1, 54) = 38.42, MSE = .018, p < 
.001, as a function of task block, which are illustrated in Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively. 
The contrasts also revealed a quadratic trend for the increase of RT CV over the duration of 
the task, F(1, 54) = 8.99, MSE = .006, p < .01. Taken together, these results suggest that, 
irrespective of the condition, mind wandering increased linearly as time on task increased. 
 
Figure 8. SART errors as a function of task block.  
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Figure 9. RT CV as a function of task block.  
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, a brief guided mindfulness intervention did not reduce mind 
wandering in participants viewing a lecture video. Experiment 2 was designed as a 
conceptual replication of the Mrazek et al. (2012), which demonstrated an effect of a brief 
mindfulness intervention on the SART, a repetitive laboratory task. Experiment 2 
investigated whether the brief, 10-minute guided mindfulness intervention used in 
Experiment 1 could reduce mind wandering during the SART.  Based on the results of Mrazek 
et al., it was predicted that the brief mindfulness intervention would lead to reductions in 
performance indices of mind wandering during the SART, when compared to the control 
group. Contrary to prediction, Experiment 2 failed to replicate the effect and revealed no 
significant differences in behavioral indices of mind wandering during the SART between the 
mindfulness group and the control group. These results demonstrate that the brief 
mindfulness intervention did not lead to substantial reductions in mind wandering during 
the SART, an outcome incongruent with Mrazek et al. (2012). 
103 
 
Although the use of guided mindfulness meditation auditory tapes such as that used 
in this dissertation are the most common way to induce a state of mindfulness (e.g., Erisman 
& Roemer, 2010; Taraban et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2017), it should be noted that Mrazek et al. 
(2012) used an unguided mindfulness practice.  Their participants were instructed to focus 
attention on their breath and bring it back to their breath whenever they notice they have 
been mind wandering. The instructions were first displayed on the computer screen and 
then participants spent the next eight minutes monitoring their breath and bringing 
attention back to the breath when strayed away from it. 
There is no apparent reason to believe that the guided versus the unguided 
mindfulness practice should produce different effects on mind wandering.  In both cases the 
mindfulness meditation encourages individuals to anchor attention to a single object (e.g., 
one’s breathing), and it is expected that this self-regulation of focused attention will lead to 
better attentional control. The increase in attentional control allows individuals to notice 
when they have strayed away from an ongoing activity more quickly and redirect attention 
from TUTs to the ongoing activity more quickly (Mrazek, Franklin et al., 2013; Mrazek et al., 
2012). But, while Mrazek et al. (2012) showed that an eight-minute, unguided mindfulness 
practice could reduce performance indices of mind wandering during the SART, Experiment 
2 yielded no corroborative evidence for the beneficial effect of a brief, 10-minute, guided 
mindfulness intervention on behavioral markers of mind wandering during the SART. 
One potential explanation why Experiment 2 failed to replicate the findings of Mrazek 
et al. (2012) is that brief mindfulness interventions are not robust enough to always induce 
a mindfulness state that leads to substantial and consistent reductions in mind wandering. 
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There was no effect of the brief mindfulness intervention in either Experiment 1 or 
Experiment 2, suggesting that a brief mindfulness intervention may not be strong enough to 
exert immediate beneficial effects on attentional control and thus to reduce mind wandering 
during sustained attention tasks. Repeated and consistent practice may be needed to observe 
substantial improvements in the capacity to appraise the contents of thought and in the 
ability to focus attention.  
Another potential explanation for why Experiment 2 failed to replicate the findings of 
Mrazek et al. (2012) is the difference between a guided and unguided brief mindfulness 
intervention. As already stated, there is no apparent reason for why they should differ. 
Nonetheless, it may be the case that an unguided, brief mindfulness intervention has a 
different effect from that of a guided, brief mindfulness intervention on mind wandering such 
that immediate reductions on mind wandering could be obtained through unguided, brief 
mindfulness interventions but not through guided, brief mindfulness interventions. While it 
could be argued that a guided, brief mindfulness intervention should be more robust than an 
unguided intervention, a direct replication of Mrazek et al. is needed before clearly drawing 
the conclusion that brief mindfulness interventions are not robust enough to produce 
consistent immediate beneficial effects over mind wandering.  Regardless, given that not all 
brief mindfulness interventions appear to work, future research could investigate the effects 
of brief but somewhat longer-term mindfulness meditation training interventions on mind 
wandering (e.g., two brief interventions with practice and feedback in between). This will be 
discussed further in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 4. CORRELATIONAL EXAMINATION 
Experiments 1 and 2 found no evidence that the brief mindfulness meditation 
intervention had any beneficial effects on mind wandering. The analysis of individual 
differences in Experiment 1 was focused on mind wandering during the lecture video and 
lecture comprehension. In Experiment 2, however, an analysis of individual differences was 
not performed due to the relatively low number of participants. Combining the individual 
differences measures for participants from Experiments 1 and 2, a correlational examination 
was done that focused on the relationship among the individual differences measures 
themselves, that is, media multitasking frequency, trait mindfulness, frequency of 
dissociative experiences, and mind wandering tendency. As pointed out before, mindfulness 
and mind wandering are conceptualized as opposing constructs, and thus, trait mindfulness 
and mind wandering tendency are conceived as being inversely associated (Mrazek, Franklin 
et al., 2013; Mrazek, Phillips et al., 2013). The correlational examination further explored this 
relationship, taking into consideration media multitasking and frequency of dissociative 
experiences.  
Media multitasking refers to concurrently engaging in and consuming multiple types 
of media (Ophir et al., 2009). In their pioneering study regarding the effect of media 
multitasking on attentional control, Ophir et al. (2009) devised a media multitasking index 
(MMI) to measure media multitasking frequency across various types of media and 
investigated the role of media multitasking in attentional control. The MMI was used to 
categorize participants into heavy media multitaskers (HMM) and light media multitaskers 
(LMM). Ophir et al. found that the performance of HMMs on a task-switching paradigm was 
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poorer than that of LMMs and that HMMs demonstrated an increased susceptibility to 
interference from task-irrelevant stimuli during a filtering task. Ophir et al. concluded that 
HMMs had a greater proclivity for bottom-up attentional control, directed by environmental 
stimuli, and that they tended to process information in an exploratory manner, focusing on 
broader aspects rather than details. In contrast, LMMs were reported to demonstrate a 
greater tendency for top-down attentional control, allowing them to better focus and sustain 
attention on a single task in the face of interference.  
Subsequent studies have produced mixed results regarding this account of media 
multitasking and its deleterious effects on attentional control. Cain and Mitroff (2011) and 
Sanbonmatsu, Strayer, Medeiros-Ward, and Watson (2013) provided further support for the 
view that when compared to LMMs, HMMs tend to suffer from performance decrements 
during demanding cognitive tasks due to their wider attentional focus and decreased ability 
to suppress distractions. Nonetheless, Alzahabi and Becker (2013) demonstrated that HMMs 
outperformed their LMM counterparts in a task-switching paradigm and that the 
performance of HMMs and LMMs did not differ on a dual-task paradigm. Similarly, Minear, 
Brasher, McCurdy, Lewis, and Younggren (2013) showed that HMMs and LMMs did not differ 
in their ability to task-switch. Taken together, previous findings regarding the role of media 
multitasking in attentional control are somewhat inconclusive.  
Despite these mixed results, there exists some evidence for a link between media 
multitasking and mind wandering (e.g., Ralph, Thomson, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2014). Ralph et 
al. (2014) found that media multitasking frequency was positively associated with mind 
wandering tendency in daily life and that it was negatively associated with trait mindfulness. 
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The authors also proposed and tested a plausible causal model in which the effect of media 
multitasking on mind wandering was fully mediated by trait mindfulness. Accordingly, this 
model predicted that media multitasking would lead to deficits in top-down attentional 
control and decreased levels of mindfulness, which would in turn result in greater 
propensity for mind wandering. 
While this model was proposed based on correlational data, its tenets are consistent 
with some findings from neuroimaging studies. Specifically, Loh and Kanai (2014) observed 
that HMMs had smaller gray-matter density in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which is 
strongly implicated in top-down attentional control (van Veen & Carter, 2002) and has been 
shown to be positively affected by mindfulness meditation training (Allan et al., 2012; Hölzel 
et al., 2007; Tang & Posner, 2013; Treadway & Lazer, 2010). Furthermore, it has also been 
argued that media multitasking may lead to increased activity in the default mode network 
(DMN; Ziegler, Mishra, & Gazzaley, 2015), which is implicated in mind wandering (Buckner 
et al., 2008; Mason et al., 2007). Given the functional connectivity between the ACC and DMN 
(Buckner et al., 2008), it is plausible that media multitasking may lead to lower levels of 
mindfulness (lessened activity in the ACC), which in turn results in greater propensity for 
mind wandering (greater activity in the DMN). Therefore, it was predicted that media 
multitasking frequency would positively predict the propensity for mind wandering through 
trait mindfulness. 
As discussed earlier, dissociation refers to transient lapses or disruptions in the 
integration of experiences, thoughts, feelings, memories, and actions into consciousness 
(Bernstein & Putnam, 1986). Considering that dissociation reflects a form of detachment 
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from the present conscious experience, dissociation and mindfulness can be thought of as 
being inversely related such that those individuals who tend to have frequent dissociative 
experiences should demonstrate lower levels of mindfulness in their daily life. In fact, it has 
been shown that trait mindfulness and frequency of dissociative experiences were 
negatively associated (Walach, Buchheld, Buttenmüller, Kleinknecht, & Schmidt, 2006). 
Therefore, it was predicted that frequency of dissociative experiences would be negatively 
associated with trait mindfulness and would be positively associated with media 
multitasking frequency and mind wandering tendency. It was also predicted that, similar to 
trait mindfulness, frequency of dissociative experiences would play a mediating role in the 
relationship between media multitasking frequency and mind wandering tendency. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were the undergraduate students who participated in Experiment 1 and 
in Experiment 2. This resulted in a dataset containing the data from 233 participants (133 
females). The mean age of these participants was 19.7. 
Materials 
Materials included the questionnaires used in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
Specifically, the MMI, MAAS, DES, and MWQ were used. The MMI is a measure of the 
frequency of media multitasking, the MAAS is a measure of trait mindfulness, the DES is a 
measure of the frequency of dissociative experiences, and the MWQ is a measure of mind 
wandering tendency. The MMI demonstrated good internal consistency in the present 
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sample (Cronbach’s alpha = .92). The reliability estimates were also good for the MAAS (α = 
.87), the DES (α = .91), and the MWQ (α = .81). 
Procedures 
As described earlier, participants in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 completed the 
questionnaires through an online Qualtrics survey before the experimental manipulation. 
The questionnaire data from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were combined. 
Results 
Regarding the relationship between media multitasking and mind wandering, it was 
expected that trait mindfulness and frequency of dissociative experiences would mediate 
this relationship. Specifically, it was hypothesized that self-reports of media multitasking 
frequency would positively predict self-reports of mind wandering tendency through self-
reports of trait mindfulness and frequency of dissociative experiences such that those who 
media multitask more frequently would demonstrate lower levels of trait mindfulness and 
higher frequency of dissociative experiences, which in turn would lead to increased mind 
wandering tendency. To test this parallel mediation model, a bootstrapped (10000) 
mediation analysis was conducted using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). 
Correlations among the variables are presented in Table 13.  The results of the mediation 
analysis for all participants are presented in Figure 10. The mediation model is reported 
without the frequency of dissociative experiences because it did not significantly contribute 
to the model. 
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Table 13. Correlations among individual differences measures across all participants from both 
experiments 
Measure M (SD) 1 2 3 4 
1. Mind wandering tendency 3.92 (.84) .810    
2. Trait mindfulness 3.89 (.73) -.718** .867   
3. Dissociative experiences 2.66 (1.44) .288** -.444** .909  
4. Media multitasking frequency 2.56 (.78) .367** -.360** .213** .916 
Values on the diagonal indicate the reliability estimates (Cronbach’s alpha) for each individual differences  
measure. The mean values were comparable to previous studies for MWQ (Mrazek, Phillips et al., 2013), 
MAAS (Mrazek, Phillips et al., 2013), DES (Van IJzendoorn et al., 1996), and MMI (Ralph et al., 2014).  
N = 232.  ** p < .01. 
 
As shown in Table 13, correlations among the variables were congruent with the 
conceptual associations among these variables. Specifically, media multitasking frequency 
was positively associated with mind wandering tendency and frequency of dissociative 
experiences and it was negatively associated with trait mindfulness. Mind wandering 
tendency was negatively associated with trait mindfulness and positively associated with 
frequency of dissociative experiences, as expected. Lastly, trait mindfulness and frequency 
of dissociative experiences were negatively associated. 
 
Figure 10. The mediating role of trait mindfulness in the relationship between media multitasking 
and mind wandering. Note that the same model was run with the frequency of dissociative 
experiences added as a parallel mediator. Results revealed the frequency of dissociative experiences 
did not significantly contribute to the model. Therefore, it was not included in the analysis and all 
analyses were conducted with trait mindfulness as the single mediator. 
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As can be seen from Figure 10, media multitasking frequency significantly predicted 
trait mindfulness (path a), b = -.34, SE = .063, p < .001, 95% CI [-.46, -.21]. Media multitasking 
frequency alone explained 13% of the variance in trait mindfulness, F(1, 230) = 28.38, MSE 
= .464, p < .001, R2 = .13. Trait mindfulness significantly predicted mind wandering tendency 
(path b), b = -.78, SE = .062, p < .001, 95% CI [-.90, -.65], and the direct effect of media 
multitasking frequency on mind wandering tendency was statistically significant (path c’), b 
= .14, SE = .054, p < .05, 95% CI [.03, .24]. This model for the direct effect of media 
multitasking frequency on mind wandering tendency (path c’), controlling for the effect of 
trait mindfulness (path b) explained 53% of the variance in mind wandering tendency, F(2, 
229) = 114.07, MSE = .335, p < .001, R2 = .53. Lastly, the total effect of media multitasking on 
mind wandering tendency was statistically significant (path c), b = .40, SE = .069, p < .001, 
95% CI [.26, .53]. Media multitasking frequency alone explained 14% of the variance in mind 
wandering tendency, F(1, 230) = 32.47, MSE = .613, p < .001, R2 = .14. The indirect effect of 
media multitasking frequency on mind wandering tendency through trait mindfulness was 
significant as well, indirect effect = .26, SE = .052, p < .001, 95% CI [.16, .37]. 
Given that all paths were statistically significant, that the inclusion of trait 
mindfulness as a mediator led to reductions in the magnitude of the effect of media 
multitasking frequency on mind wandering tendency (path c’ < path c), and that the indirect 
effect of media multitasking frequency on mind wandering tendency through trait 
mindfulness was significant, it can be concluded that trait mindfulness partially mediated 
the relationship between media multitasking frequency and mind wandering tendency. 
These results suggest that habitual media multitasking may lead to increased tendency to 
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mind wander in daily life. These results also provide support for the notion that media 
multitasking may lead to lower levels of mindfulness, which in turn results in greater 
propensity for mind wandering. 
Discussion 
The correlational examination investigated a potential causal relationship between 
media multitasking frequency and mind wandering tendency as mediated by trait 
mindfulness. In line with Ralph et al.’s (2014) deficit-producing hypothesis, which suggests 
that media multitasking results in deficits in attentional control by increasing one’s 
susceptibility to bottom-up control of attention, the current study revealed that trait 
mindfulness partially mediated the relationship between media multitasking and mind 
wandering. This partial mediation model suggests that habitual media multitasking is 
associated with increased tendency to mind wander in daily life and that increased 
frequency of media multitasking is associated with lower levels of mindfulness, which is in 
turn associated with greater propensity for mind wandering. Therefore, it is plausible that 
heavy media multitaskers may find it onerous to prevent their minds from wandering off 
because they compromise top-down attentional control while frequently and consistently 
switching attention between multiple forms of media, diminishing their ability to stay 
focused on a single task.  
Though based on correlation data, this causal interpretation is congruent with 
previous studies demonstrating heavy media multitaskers’ increased susceptibility to 
bottom-up attentional control and superficial processing, compared to light media 
multitaskers (Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Ophir et al., 2009). This interpretation is also consistent 
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with recent findings from neuroimaging studies. Specifically, Loh and Kanai (2014) observed 
that HMMs had smaller gray-matter density in the ACC, which is strongly implicated in top-
down attentional control (van Veen & Carter, 2002) and has been shown to be positively 
affected by mindfulness meditation training (Allan et al., 2012; Hölzel et al., 2007; Tang & 
Posner, 2013; Treadway & Lazer, 2010). Furthermore, it has also been argued that media 
multitasking may lead to increased activity in the DMN (Ziegler et al., 2015), which is 
implicated in mind wandering (Buckner et al., 2008; Mason et al., 2007). Hence, it is plausible 
that media multitasking may lead to lower levels of mindfulness (lessened activity in the 
ACC), which in turn results in greater propensity for mind wandering (greater activity in the 
DMN). Given that the current study tested this causal model based on correlational data, the 
extent to which this proposition is tenable remains an open area of investigation for future 
experimental and/or longitudinal studies.
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The current dissertation set out to disentangle whether inducing a state of 
mindfulness through a brief mindfulness intervention prior to engaging in a sustained 
attention task could reduce mind wandering in the subsequent task. Given that a similar brief 
mindfulness intervention has been shown to lead to reductions in mind wandering during a 
laboratory attention task (Mrazek et al., 2012), the dissertation sought to further investigate 
the viability of such a brief intervention for reducing mind wandering during an ecologically 
valid sustained attention task. Although such brief interventions may not be as robust as 
long-term interventions, nor are they claimed to be, investigations utilizing brief 
interventions attempt to determine the extent to which brief mindfulness interventions 
could produce transient, positive benefits, with the aim of shedding light on immediate 
benefits of brief mindfulness interventions and their application to various domains, 
including daily life settings, work environments, education, etc. 
Experiment 1 investigated the influence of a brief, 10-minute guided mindfulness 
intervention on mind wandering during an ecologically valid sustained attention task, i.e., 
learning from a lecture video. The results demonstrated that the brief mindfulness 
intervention had no beneficial effects on the occurrence of mind wandering during the 
lecture video, nor on its disruptive effects on lecture comprehension. In an attempt to 
conceptually replicate Mrazek et al. (2012), a previous study in the literature that guided the 
current dissertation, Experiment 2 investigated the influence of the 10-minute mindfulness 
intervention on behavioral indices of mind wandering during a laboratory sustained 
attention task, the SART. The results demonstrated that the brief intervention did not lead 
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to any substantial reductions in the performance markers of mind wandering during the 
SART. Collectively, the current experiments indicate that the brief, guided mindfulness 
intervention used in the current dissertation has no immediate beneficial effects on 
attentional control and mind wandering during demanding tasks. 
While the current study revealed several null findings regarding the impact of the 
brief mindfulness intervention on mind wandering, it did yield various findings consistent 
with previous studies in the literature. To begin with, Experiment 1 demonstrated that mind 
wandering during the lecture video was the reason for performance decrements on the 
subsequent lecture comprehension test, providing further support for the well-established 
deleterious effect of mind wandering on task performance (McVay & Kane, 2012; Mrazek, 
Franklin et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2007; Smallwood et al., 2008; Reichle et al., 2010; 
Unsworth & McMillan, 2013; Szpunar et al., 2013). Moreover, Experiment 1 examined the 
roles of interest in the lecture material, motivation to learn from the lecture video, and prior 
knowledge of the lecture material in the propensity for mind wandering and in the influence 
of mind wandering on lecture comprehension.  The results from structural equation 
modeling showed that interest in and prior knowledge of the lecture material significantly 
contributed to mind wandering during the lecture video. Similar to prior work on the 
association between topic interest and mind wandering (Hollis & Was, 2014; Lindquist & 
McLean, 2011; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013), greater interest in the lecture video predicted 
fewer mind wandering episodes during the lecture video, suggesting that individuals who 
found the lecture video more interesting mind wandered less during the lecture video. Also, 
interest in the lecture material had an indirect effect on lecture comprehension through 
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mind wandering. Interestingly, prior knowledge of the lecture material positively predicted 
the propensity for mind wandering, suggesting that individuals who had more background 
information on the lecture material mind wandered more during the lecture video. The 
indirect effect of prior knowledge on lecture comprehension through mind wandering was 
not significant, suggesting that the tendency of those individuals to indulge in mind 
wandering during the lecture video did not negatively affect their comprehension of the 
lecture material. 
Collectively, these results show that mind wandering during lecture videos impedes 
the comprehension of the lecture material, that increased interest in the lecture material 
leads to fewer mind wandering episodes during the lecture video, and that greater prior 
knowledge of the lecture material affords the luxury of mind wandering without impeding 
the comprehension of the lecture video too much. When an individual is not interested in the 
lecture material, however, the individual tends to mind wander more, which in turn leads to 
poorer lecture comprehension. This finding regarding the role of interest in the propensity 
for mind wandering may be applicable to the presentation of information such that 
presenting information in an interesting format could reduce mind wandering when 
compared to a dull presentation format, which can be easily tested in future studies. 
Experiment 1 also examined what individual differences may predict the propensity 
for mind wandering during the lecture video, and found that mind wandering tendency in 
daily life positively predicted the propensity for mind wandering during the lecture video. 
As expected, individuals with a greater tendency to mind wander in daily life were caught 
mind wandering more frequently during the lecture video than those individuals who 
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reported a lower mind wandering tendency in daily life. This provides further corroborative 
evidence for the association between mind wandering tendency in daily life and the 
propensity for mind wandering during laboratory tasks as well as for the convergent validity 
of the self-reported measure of mind wandering tendency, the MWQ (Mrazek, Phillips et al., 
2013). 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that SART errors and RT CV, the two performance 
markers of mind wandering during the SART, increased as a function of time on task, 
providing further evidence for the direct link between mind wandering and time spent on a 
task (Farley et al., 2013; Risko et al., 2012; Risko et al., 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
This association suggests that mind wandering increases as time on task increases. Although 
the ability to maintain sustained attention is remarkable, individuals can find it harder to 
keep attention focused on an ongoing task as time spent on the task increases, eventually 
leading to a drift of attention from the ongoing task to TUTs. Maintaining sustained attention 
and preventing mind wandering can be even more challenging when the immediate task is 
boring and unrewarding to the individual, as was surely the case with the SART. Considering 
that mind wandering results in impaired task performance, it is prudent to further explore 
what strategies might be useful for mitigating mind wandering during critical tasks requiring 
concentration, such as driving, air traffic controlling and security screening at airports, and 
to curtail its deleterious effects on task performance. 
The current study also examined a plausible causal relationship between self-reports 
of media multitasking frequency and mind wandering tendency as mediated by self-reports 
of trait mindfulness. Congruent with the deficit-producing hypothesis (Ralph et al., 2014), 
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the bootstrapped mediation analysis revealed that the relationship between media 
multitasking and mind wandering was partially mediated by trait mindfulness. This partial 
mediation model suggests that habitual media multitasking is associated with an increased 
proclivity for mind wandering. The model also suggests that increased media multitasking 
frequency is associated with lower levels of trait mindfulness, which is in turn associated 
with increased proclivity for mind wandering. Hence, it may be the case that top-down 
attentional control is compromised due to frequent and consistent switching of attention 
between various types of media, reducing the ability to stay focused on a single task. From 
the perspective of the decoupling hypothesis of mind wandering (Schooler et al., 2011; 
Smallwood, 2011), it could be argued that in an attempt to attend to multiple types of media, 
heavy media multitaskers (HMM) practice repeatedly decoupling attention from a single 
perceptual source, increasing their proclivity for bottom-up distraction. As a result, heavy 
media multitaskers may also have difficulty in warding off mind wandering because of their 
susceptibility to distraction (Ophir et al., 2009), which is in this case self-distraction.  
While this interpretation is based on correlation data and thus should be cautiously 
approached, its tenets are consistent with previous studies showing that when compared to 
light media multitaskers (LMMs), HMMs were more susceptible to bottom-up attentional 
control and superficial processing (Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Ophir et al., 2009). This 
interpretation is also supported by some recent findings from neuroimaging studies.  
Specifically, Loh and Kanai (2014) showed that gray-matter density in the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), which is implicated in top-down attentional control (van Veen & Carter, 2002), 
was smaller for HMMs, when compared to LMMs. It has also been shown that mindfulness 
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meditation training positively affects the ACC (Allan et al., 2012; Hölzel et al., 2007; Tang & 
Posner, 2013; Treadway & Lazer, 2010). Moreover, Ziegler et al. (2015) argued that media 
multitasking may lead to heightened activation in the default mode network (DMN), which 
is mostly associated with mind wandering (Buckner et al., 2008; Mason et al., 2007). Thus, it 
is possible that habitual media multitasking may result in lower levels of mindfulness 
(lessened activity in the ACC), which in turn leads to an increased proclivity for mind 
wandering (greater activity in the DMN). Because this plausible causal relationship was 
tested using the correlational data from the current study, it is not possible to make a firm 
causal inference, which warrants future experimental and/or longitudinal investigations. 
The results from the current study regarding the influence of the brief, 10-minute 
guided mindfulness intervention on mind wandering are contradictory to those from Mrazek 
et al. (2012). Mrazek et al. showed that a similar brief, 8-minute unguided mindfulness 
intervention led to substantial reductions in behavioral indices of mind wandering during 
the SART. Considering the null findings from Experiment 2 (a conceptual replication of the 
Mrazek et al. study) regarding the influence of a brief mindfulness intervention on behavioral 
indices of mind wandering during the SART, it is believed that the null findings from 
Experiment 1 are not due to the real-life task used in Experiment 1. Rather, taken together, 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 suggest that brief guided mindfulness interventions may not 
be sufficient to induce a mindfulness state that leads to substantial reductions in mind 
wandering and in its deleterious effects on task performance. Repeated and consistent 
practice may be needed to observe substantial improvements in attentional control and thus 
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in the ability to prevent one’s mind from wandering off to thoughts irrelevant to an 
immediate task.  
The failure to find an effect of the brief mindfulness intervention with the SART task 
was unexpected given that the task was identical to that used in Mrazek et al. (2012). As 
already discussed, however, the current dissertation employed a guided, brief mindfulness 
intervention, whereas Mrazek et al. used an unguided, brief mindfulness intervention. Thus, 
it is possible that guided and unguided brief mindfulness interventions differ in how they 
influence an individual’s ability to pay attention to the present moment and to prevent mind 
wandering. Unguided interventions might require more effort, for example. Compared to 
guided brief mindfulness interventions, unguided brief mindfulness interventions might 
have a different impact on mind wandering such that immediate reductions in mind 
wandering could be obtained through unguided brief mindfulness interventions, but not 
through guided brief mindfulness interventions. Although it could be argued that a guided 
brief mindfulness intervention should produce stronger effects than an unguided 
intervention, the guided training did not produce an increase in state mindfulness as 
reflected on the TMS. Perhaps unguided training would. Perhaps unguided training helps 
naïve participants to become more self-aware and that allows inhibition of mind wandering. 
This possibility should be empirically examined via a direct replication of Mrazek et al. 
before concluding that brief mindfulness interventions are not robust enough to produce 
consistent immediate beneficial effects over mind wandering. 
Previous studies have shown that longer-term mindfulness meditation training 
(MMT) interventions lasting from several weeks to months could lead to substantial 
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improvements in attentional control (Heeren et al., 2009; Jha et al., 2010; Jha et al., 2007; 
Sahdra et al., 2011; Zeidan et al, 2010) and executive functioning (Moore & Malinowski, 
2009; Teper & Inzlicht, 2013). The observed behavioral effects of MMT on attentional control 
and executive functioning have also been linked to changes in the neural underpinnings of 
these cognitive mechanisms (Allan et al., 2012; Hölzel et al., 2007; Tang & Posner, 2013; 
Treadway & Lazer, 2010). Specifically, existing studies have shown an increase in the 
activation of the ACC, which has been implicated in directing attention and detecting 
conflicting information (van Veen & Carter, 2002). Increased activity in the ACC is attributed 
to the exertion of a top-down control to maintain attention on a target in the presence of 
external distractions or trains of thought conflicting with immediate task goals (van Veen & 
Carter, 2002). During mindfulness meditation, individuals regulate attention by selecting 
and focusing on a specific object and redirecting attention back to the chosen object when 
attention drifts off to other thoughts, feelings, or sensations. Attention regulation is 
commonly practiced and developed in early phases of MMT, which are mostly related to the 
development of focused attention. 
MMT could conceivably exert its regulatory effect on mind wandering by enhancing 
attentional control and executive functioning, which is consistent with extant studies on 
neural underpinnings of MMT and mind wandering (e.g., Hasenkamp, Wilson-Mendenhall, 
Duncan, & Barsalou, 2012). MMT (including both short-term and longer-term interventions) 
has been shown to lead to reductions in the activation of the DMN (Brefczynski-Lewis, Lutz, 
Schaefer, Levinson, & Davidson, 2007; Brewer et al., 2011; Tang et al., 2009). The DMN is an 
interconnected network of brain regions that are actively recruited during rest states, or in 
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the absence of an external task and are implicated in mind wandering (Buckner et al., 2008; 
Christoff et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007; Mittner, Hawkins, Boekel, & Forstmann, 2016). 
Thus, it is plausible that MMT could reduce mind wandering during a demanding task by 
dampening the activity in the DMN (Mrazek, Franklin et al., 2013; Mrazek et al., 2012), which 
in turn precludes the intrusion of TUTs into consciousness and the allocation of attentional 
resources to the processing of TUTs (Christoff et al., 2009; Mittner et al., 2016). 
The current study indicates that further investigations into the influence of 
mindfulness interventions on mind wandering are warranted. For instance, future research 
could investigate the influence of a more thorough, but still brief, mindfulness intervention 
on mind wandering. Such an investigation could have participants engage in a brief 
mindfulness meditation and then discuss with the participants what they experienced 
during the meditation practice. Having ensured that they understand the importance of 
focusing on their breathing and of nonjudgmentally bringing attention back to their 
breathing whenever their minds wander off, the experimenters could have the participants 
engage in another brief mindfulness meditation, after which the participants could go on to 
the experimental task. In so doing, the empirical question is whether this type of modified 
brief intervention might reduce mind wandering. 
Given that there was no evidence of any immediate benefits from a brief mindfulness 
intervention, it would be especially useful for future studies to focus on short-term 
mindfulness interventions (e.g., multiple practices over several days or a few weeks) and to 
incorporate a self-regulated training regimen that allows participants to practice 
mindfulness meditation repeatedly and consistently over an extended period of time, as 
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opposed to a one-time practice. In one such study, Mrazek, Franklin et al. (2013) showed that 
a two-week mindfulness training with eight 45-minute in-class sessions and 10-minute daily 
individual practices for the period of two weeks led to reductions in mind wandering while 
reading, to substantial improvements on reading comprehension and to increases in 
working memory capacity. Such short-term interventions could also utilize a monitoring 
system to track participants’ progress in the training regimen. One potential way of doing so 
is to use smartphone-based mobile applications specifically designed for self-regulated 
mindfulness meditation practices such as Headspace (Puddicombe, 2016). Capitalizing on 
the affordances of smartphones, not only do such mobile applications allow participants to 
self-regulate their practice sessions, but they also enable researchers to monitor 
participants’ progress. 
One limitation of the current study concerns the extent to which individuals in the 
mindfulness meditation group could immerse in the brief meditation practice. A limitation 
inherently present in most contemplative studies, it is not possible to behaviorally determine 
the extent to which individuals are able to focus on the present moment during the 
meditation practice without using physiological measures. This limitation may be even more 
pronounced for brief meditation interventions, in which individuals have little guidance as 
to how well they are engaging in the meditation practice. Therefore, future studies could 
address this limitation by incorporating physiological measures into the experimental 
procedures to assess individuals’ engagement level with the meditation practice. Such 
measures can also be useful for the purposes of providing real-time feedback to the 
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individuals regarding their current state of being and helping them better focus on the 
chosen object of attention or the anchor (i.e., one’s breathing). 
As pointed out earlier, it can be challenging for novice meditators to immerse in the 
meditation practice. Given that training studies usually employ participants with little to no 
experience in mindfulness meditation, future studies could devise short-term and/or longer-
term interventions that provide mindfulness meditation training in virtual reality, utilizing 
the enriched experience of immersion afforded by virtual reality. These studies could thus 
investigate how meditation in virtual reality differs, if at all, from traditional training 
regimens in inducing a mindfulness state, in cultivating mindfulness as a trait, in improving 
attentional control, and in reducing mind wandering. 
The recent upsurge of both academic and public interest in brief mindfulness 
meditation practices has resulted from well-established benefits of long-term mindfulness 
interventions. Accordingly, this dissertation set out to disentangle whether participants 
could reap the benefits of mindfulness meditation training through a brief mindfulness 
intervention. Despite the increasing coverage and popularity of the outstanding benefits of 
brief mindfulness meditation practices on attention in the mainstream media (e.g., Kaplan, 
2016), the current study demonstrated that a brief mindfulness intervention had no 
immediate beneficial influence over mind wandering nor on its disruptive effects on task 
performance during both an ecologically valid sustained attention task, watching a lecture 
video, and a laboratory sustained attention task, the SART. However, the current experiment 
provided further evidence for the well-documented disruptive effects of mind wandering on 
task performance, specifically demonstrating that increased mind wandering during the 
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lecture video led to poorer comprehension of the lecture video material. Future research 
should focus on investigating the effects of more thorough mindfulness interventions on 
mind wandering during demanding tasks that require concentration, whose outcomes can 
have invaluable implications for various human-computer interaction contexts such as air 
traffic controlling and security screening. Given the widespread adoption and use of various 
digital technologies (e.g., smartphones and wearable devices) as platforms to deliver 
behavioral and psychological interventions, the outcomes of such investigations into more 
thorough mindfulness interventions might inform the design and development of 
intervention technologies to help individuals better focus whenever they need to do so. 
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APPENDIX A. MIND WANDERING QUESTIONNAIRE  
(MWQ, MRAZEK, PHILLIPS ET AL., 2013) 
Using the 1-6 scale below, please indicate how often you currently have each experience. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Almost 
Never 
Very 
Infrequently 
Somewhat 
Infrequently 
Somewhat 
Frequently 
Very 
Frequently 
Almost 
Always 
 
1. I have difficulty maintaining focus on simple or repetitive work. 
2. While reading, I find I haven’t been thinking about the text and must therefore read again. 
3. I do things without paying full attention. 
4. I find myself listening with one ear, thinking about something else at the same time. 
5. I mind-wander during lectures or presentations. 
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APPENDIX B. MEDIA MULTITASKING INDEX 
(MMI, OPHIR ET AL., 2009) 
Watching Television or videos 
Do you watch TV or videos? This would include watching network/cable/on-
demand/TiVo programs, as well as watching videos and/or DVDs on a TV or on a computer. 
Yes/No 
When you are watching television or videos, how often are you also doing the 
following at the same time: 
 
1 2 3 4 
Never A little of the time Some of the time Most of the time 
  
- Doing homework or reading for class 
- Playing video games 
- Surfing the web or doing other online activities 
- Listening to music 
- Using social media 
- Texting/SMS 
 
Participants answered the same set of questions for watching TV or videos, surfing 
the Web, using social media, playing video games, reading, doing homework, listening to 
lectures or presentations.  The following media uses that are part of the original MMI were 
not included in the modified version of the MMI used in the current dissertation: listening to 
music, listening to non-musical audio, talking on the phone, and reading/writing emails. 
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APPENDIX C. MINDFUL ATTENTION AWARENESS SCALE  
(MAAS, BROWN & RYAN, 2003) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Almost Never Very 
Infrequently 
Somewhat 
Infrequently 
Somewhat 
Frequently 
Very 
Frequently 
Almost 
Always 
 
1. I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of it until some time later. 
2. I break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying attention, or thinking of 
something else. 
3. I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the present. 
4. I tend to walk quickly to get where I’m going without paying attention to what I 
experience along the way. 
5. I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort until they really grab my 
attention. 
6. I forget a person’s name almost as soon as I’ve been told it for the first time. 
7. It seems I am “running on automatic,” without much awareness of what I’m doing. 
8. I rush through activities without being really attentive to them.  
9. I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch with what I’m doing right 
now to get there. 
10. I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what I'm doing. 
11. I find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing something else at the same time. 
12. I drive places on ‘automatic pilot’ and then wonder why I went there. 
13. I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past. 
14. I find myself doing things without paying attention. 
15. I snack without being aware that I’m eating. 
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APPENDIX D. DISSOCIATIVE EXPERIENCES SCALE  
(DES, BERNSTEIN & PUTNAM, 1986) 
This questionnaire consists of 20 questions* about experiences you may have had in 
your daily life. We are interested in how often you have had these experiences. To answer 
the questions, please determine to what degree the experience described in the question 
applies to you and circle the appropriate number to show what percentage of the time you 
have had the experience. 
Never | 0% 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100% | Always 
1. Some people have the experience of driving a car and suddenly realizing that they don’t 
remember what has happened during all or part of the trip.  
2. Some people find that sometimes they are listening to someone talk and they suddenly 
realize that they did not hear part or all of what was just said.  
3. Some people have the experience of finding themselves dressed in clothes that they don’t 
remember putting on.  
4. Some people sometimes find that they are approached by people that they do not know 
who call them by another name or insist that they have met them before.  
5. Some people find that they have no memory for some important events in their lives (for 
example, a wedding or graduation).  
6. Some people have the experience of being accused of lying when they do not think that 
they have lied.  
7. Some people have the experience of looking in a mirror and not recognizing themselves.  
8. Some people have the experience of sometimes remembering a past event so vividly that 
they feel as if they were reliving that event.  
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9. Some people have the experience of not being sure whether things that they remember 
happening really did happen or whether they just dreamed them.  
10. Some people have the experience of being in a familiar place but finding it strange and 
unfamiliar.  
11. Some people find that when they are watching television or a movie they become so 
absorbed in the story that they are unaware of other events happening around them.  
12. Some people sometimes find that they become so involved in a fantasy or daydream that 
it feels as though it were really happening to them.  
13. Some people find that they sometimes are able to ignore pain.  
14. Some people find that they sometimes sit staring off into space, thinking of nothing, and 
are not aware of the passage of time.  
15. Some people sometimes find that when they are alone they talk out loud to themselves.  
16. Some people sometimes find that in certain situations they are able to do things with 
amazing ease and spontaneity that would usually be difficult for them (for example, 
sports, work, social interactions, etc.).  
17. Some people sometimes find that they cannot remember whether they have done 
something or have just thought about doing that thing (for example, not knowing 
whether they have just mailed a letter or have just thought about mailing it).  
18. Some people sometimes find evidence that they have done things that they do not 
remember doing.  
19. Some people sometimes find writings, drawings, or notes among their belongings that 
they must have done but cannot remember doing.  
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20. Some people sometimes feel as if they are looking at the world through a fog so that 
people and objects appear far away or unclear.  
 
*. The original DES is a 28-item questionnaire, but this dissertation used a 20-item 
modified version of the DES due to the sensitive nature of the remaining eight items 
concerned with traumatic experiences 
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APPENDIX E. TORONTO MINDFULNESS SCALE  
(TMS, LAU ET AL., 2006) 
We are interested in what you just experienced while listening to the audio recording. 
Below is a list of things that people sometimes experience. Please indicate the extent to which 
you agree with each statement. In other words, how well does the statement describe what 
you just experienced, just now? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all A little Moderately Quite a bit Very much 
 
1. I experienced myself as separate from my changing thoughts and feelings. 
2. I was more concerned with being open to my experiences than controlling or changing 
them 
3. I was curious about what I might learn about myself by taking notice of how I react to 
certain thoughts, feelings or sensations. 
4. I experienced my thoughts more as events in my mind than as a necessarily accurate 
reflection of the way things ‘really’ are. 
5. I was curious to see what my mind was up to from moment to moment. 
6. I was curious about each of the thoughts and feelings that I was having. 
7. I was receptive to observing unpleasant thoughts and feelings without interfering 
with them. 
8. I was more invested in just watching my experiences as they arose, than in figuring 
out what they could mean. 
9. I approached each experience by trying to accept it, no matter whether it was pleasant 
or unpleasant. 
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10. I remained curious about the nature of each experience as it arose. 
11. I was aware of my thoughts and feelings without overidentifying with them. 
12. I was curious about my reactions to things. 
13. I was curious about what I might learn about myself by just taking notice of what my 
attention gets drawn to. 
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APPENDIX F. RETROSPECTIVE MEASURE OF MIND WANDERING  
(DSSQ, MATTHEWS ET AL., 1999) 
Please rate the extent to which you have engaged in the following thoughts while 
watching the lecture video. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Once A few times Often Very often 
 
1. I thought about members of my family. 
2. I thought about something that made me feel guilty. 
3. I thought about personal worries. 
4. I thought about something that made me feel angry. 
5. I thought about something that happened earlier today. 
6. I thought about something that happened in the recent past. 
7. I thought about something that happened in the distant past. 
8. I thought about something that might happen in the future. 
9. I thought about how I should work more carefully. 
10. I thought about how much time I had left. 
11. I thought about how others have done on this task. 
12. I thought about the difficulty of the problems. 
13. I thought about my level of ability. 
14. I thought about the purpose of the experiment. 
15. I thought about how I would feel if I were told how I performed. 
16. I thought about how often I get confused. 
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APPENDIX G. POST-VIDEO QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. How interested were you in the topic of the lecture video? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  
Not at all             Very much 
 
2. How interested are you in this topic in general? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  
Not at all             Very much 
 
3. How motivated were you to learn the content of the lecture video? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  
Not at all             Very much 
 
4. How much did your overall motivation influence your performance on the test? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  
Not at all             Very much 
 
5. How much background knowledge do you have on the topic of the lecture video? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  
Not at all             Very much 
 
6. How much did your prior knowledge influence your performance on the test? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  
Not at all             Very much 
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APPENDIX H. THE COMPREHENSION TEST USED IN EXPERIMENT 1 
1. Which of the following is NOT one of the four tissue types discussed in the lecture? 
a. Blood* 
b. Connective 
c. Epithelium 
d. Muscle 
 
2. Which of the following is FALSE about homeostasis? 
a. All organ systems integrate to maintain homeostasis of the body 
b. Its primary function is to maintain conditions within the body that are compatible 
with the life of the cells 
c. Problems in the maintenance of homeostasis can result in illnesses or 
pathophysiology 
d. The maintenance of homeostasis means that the body’s response to its 
surrounding remains constant irrespective of environmental conditions. 
 
3. Which of the following is TRUE about the two fluid compartments, the intracellular fluid 
compartment (ICF) and extracellular fluid compartment (ECF)? 
a. ICF is larger than ECF 
b. ECF and ICF have similar contents 
c. There is an equilibrium between ECF and ICF 
d. There is no substance transfer between ECF and ICF 
 
4. What is the correct order in which the components of reflex loops are involved in 
homeostasis control? 
a. Stimulus, Integration Center, Effectors, Sensor 
b. Sensor, Integration Center, Effectors, Stimulus 
c. Stimulus, Sensor, Integration Center, Effectors 
d. Sensor, Effectors, Integration Center, Stimulus 
 
5. Which of the following is FALSE about the skin? 
a. Its main function is protective 
b. It is the smallest organ of the human body 
c. It is an important barrier for the loss of water 
d. It keeps some of the internal organs organized 
 
6. Which of the following is FALSE about the steady state? 
a. It is present between the intracellular fluid compartment (ICF) an extracellular 
fluid compartment (ECF) 
b. There is a constant amount of substance within these two compartments in the 
steady state 
c. No energy expenditure is required to maintain the steady state between the 
two compartments 
d. In the steady state, the concentrations within these two compartments can be 
dissimilar 
149 
 
 
7. Which of the following is FALSE about what happens when you eat a bag of salty potato 
chips and drink a lot of water?  
a. The amount of sodium in your body increases 
b. The volume of fluid compartments increases 
c. The sodium concentration in your body increases 
d. The sodium concentration in your body does not change 
 
8. Which of the following is TRUE about the relationship between total body water (TBW), 
intracellular fluid compartment (ICF) and extracellular fluid compartment (ECF)? 
a. TBW is approximately 90% of total body weight 
b. ICF is 2/3 of TBW and ECF is 1/3 of TBW 
c. ICF is 1/3 of TBW and ECF is 2/3 of TBW 
d. ECF and ICF have the same capacity; each is 1/2 of TBW 
 
9. Intracellular fluid compartment (ICF) is bounded by ________________. 
a. Cytoplasm 
b. Plasma membrane 
c. IVF proteins 
d. ATPase 
 
10. Within intracellular fluid compartment (ICF), there is _____ concentrations of potassium 
(K) and _____ concentrations of sodium (Na). Within extracellular fluid compartment 
(ECF), there is _____ concentrations of potassium (K) and _____ concentrations of sodium 
(Na). 
a. High, small, high, small 
b. Small, high, small, high 
c. High, small, small, high 
d. Small, high, high small 
 
11. Intravascular compartment (IVF) and interstitial fluid space (IS) are divided by a barrier 
consisting of _______. 
a. Connective tissue cells 
b. Muscle tissue cells 
c. Nervous tissue cells 
d. Epithelial tissue cells 
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12. Which of the fluid components stores the cytoplasm, liquid components within cells? 
a. Intracellular fluid compartment (ICF) 
b. Extracellular fluid compartment (ECF) 
c. Intravascular fluid compartment (IVF) 
d. Interstitial fluid space (IS) 
 
13. How many of the organ systems in the human body will be considered in this class? 
a. 7 
b. 8 
c. 9 
d. 10 
 
14. What will be the topic of the next lecture? 
a. The relationship between homeostasis and pathological conditions 
b. Effects of homeostasis on wellness 
c. Mechanisms involved in the maintenance of homeostasis 
d. General concepts in homeostasis 
 
 
* Note that correct answers are typed in bold. 
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APPENDIX I. THOUGHT SAMPLING INSTRUCTIONS 
Instructions for self-caught mind wandering reports 
While you are watching the video, you may find that you begin to think about 
something that is unrelated to what you are watching.  In other words, you may realize 
that you have zoned out. When this happens, please press the “Space” key on the 
keyboard.  This lets us know how often and when you zone out during the lecture video.  
Do you have any questions about this? 
 
Instructions for probe-caught mind wandering reports 
In addition, at various during the lecture video, you will be interrupted with the 
following question: 
What were you just thinking about? 
1. The video. 
2. How well I’m understanding the video. 
3. A memory from the past. 
4. Something in the future. 
5. Current state of being (for example, I’m feeling hungry). 
6. Thinking about or using another technology (for example, texting; checking 
Facebook). 
7. Other. 
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APPENDIX J. CORRELATIONS AMONG STUDY VARIABLES IN EXPERIMENT 1 
Table J1. Correlations among all study variables in Experiment 1 
 MMI DES MWQ MAAS TMS SC TUT PC TUT Retro TUT Comp WMC INT MOT BG 
MMI .916             
DES .217** .952            
MWQ .361** .263** .822           
MAAS -.359** -.424** -.727** .874          
TMS .075 .223** .101 -.174* .867         
SC TUT -.020 .040 .274** -.156* -.007 .894        
PC TUT .067 .112 .271** -.104 .029 .426** .555       
Retro TUT .223** .259** .315** -.293** .125 .395** .475** .867      
Comp .015 -.060 -.010 -.081 .051 -.106 -.341** -.227** -     
WMC -.100 .015 .025 -.059 .087 -.229** -.033 .025 .037 -    
Interest .030 -.036 -.102 .031 .079 -.217** -.466** -.310** .439** .096 .909   
Motivation -.002 .038 -.054 -.031 .248** -.046 -.277** -.010 .263** .083 .338** -.060  
Background .143 .112 .179* -.159* .112 .064 -.023 -.056 .286** .070 .271** .187* .665 
Values on the diagonal reflect Cronbach’s alpha for each measure as a reliability estimate. WMC indicates the average OSPAN total score. 
MWQ, as a measure of mind wandering tendency, indicates the average score on the MWQ. MAAS, as a measure of trait mindfulness, indicates 
the average score on the MAAS. DES, as a measure of the frequency of dissociative experiences, indicates the average score on the DES. MMI, 
as a measure of media multitasking frequency, indicates the average score on the modified version of MMI. PC TUT, or probe-caught TUT, 
refers to the average proportion of probes to which participants indicated mind wandering. SC TUT, or self-caught TUT, refers to the average 
frequency of self-caught mind wandering. Retro TUT, or retrospective TUT, refers to the average score on the retrospective measure of mind 
wandering. Comp, or comprehension, refers to the average proportion of correct answers in the comprehension test. TMS, as a measure of 
state mindfulness, refers to the average score on the TMS. Interest refers to self-reported interest in the lecture video content, motivation 
refers to self-reported motivation to learn from the lecture video and background refers to self-reported prior knowledge of the lecture 
material. *. p < .05, **. p < .01 
1
5
2
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APPENDIX K. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS FOR WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY 
While a regression-based approach to individual differences analysis was adopted 
in the current dissertation, the role of working memory capacity (WMC), as measured by 
OSPAN, in the propensity for mind wandering was further analyzed, by dichotomizing 
the OSPAN score. As is commonly done in WMC research, participants were divided into 
low and high WMC groups based on their OSPAN scores. Specifically, participants with 
an OSPAN score one standard deviation below the mean were categorized into the “Low 
WMC” group (n = 29, 16.4% of the sample), and participants with an OSPAN score one 
standard deviation above the mean were categorized into the “High WMC” group (n = 23, 
13.0% of the sample).  
An independent samples t test was conducted to compare these two groups in the 
propensity for mind wandering during the lecture video, as indexed by the proportion of 
probe-caught mind wandering episodes. Results revealed no significant differences 
between low WMC individuals (M = .62, SD = .30) and high WMC individuals (M = .60, SD 
= .28) in the propensity for mind wandering during the lecture video, t(50) = .26, p = .80.  
There were also no significant differences between low WMC individuals (M = .56, SD = 
.20) and high WMC individuals (M = .59, SD = .17) in their performance on the lecture 
comprehension test, t(50) = .54, p = .59. 
A bootstrapped mediation analysis was conducted using the PROCESS macro for 
SPSS (Hayes, 2013) to assess the fit of the same mediation model presented earlier in 
Figure 4. The results of the mediation analysis are presented in Figure K1. As can be seen 
from Figure K1, the dichotomized working memory capacity variable did not predict 
mind wandering, F(1, 50) = .066, MSE = .084, p = .799, R2 = .00, nor did it have any direct 
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or indirect effects on lecture comprehension, F(1, 50) = .292, MSE = .036, p = .592, R2 = 
.01. Mind wandering, however, did predict performance decrements on the 
comprehension test, b = -.23, p = .012, 95% CI [-.403, -.051], F(2, 49) = 3.54,  MSE = .032, 
p = .037, R2 = .13, which is consistent with the findings of the mediation model presented 
in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 11. Regression coefficients for the relationship between working memory capacity (WMC) 
and lecture comprehension as mediated by mind wandering. Working memory capacity is 
dichotomized as low WMC and high WMC. Mind wandering indicates the proportion of probe-
caught TUTs. Lecture comprehension indicates the proportion of correct answers on the 
comprehension test. 
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APPENDIX L. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SART PERFORMANCE MARKERS 
 
   
   
Figure 12. Bar graphs representing the means for (a) reaction time to GO stimuli, (b) reaction time to NOGO 
stimuli, (c) proportion of correct responses to GO stimuli, and (d) proportion of correctly withheld 
responses to NOGO stimuli. As seen in (b) average RT to NOGO stimuli, which would have been zero if there 
were no SART errors, is extremely low. RTs under 100ms are considered anticipations that reflect absent-
minded responding without processing the immediate task-relevant stimuli (Cheyne et al., 2009). As seen 
in (c) participants correctly responded to almost all of the GO stimuli with a 99.97% (SD = .082) accuracy 
rate for the mindfulness group and a 99.98% (SD = .061) accuracy rate for the listening group. 
a) b) 
c) d) 
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APPENDIX M. INSTITUIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL 
 
